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High-stakes tests are widely used as measurement tools to make inferences 
about test takers’ proficiency, achievement, competence or knowledge. The stakes 
may be directly related to test performance, such as obtaining a high-school diploma, 
being granted a professional license or certificate, etc. Indirect stakes may include 
state accountability where test results are partially included in course grades and also 
tied to resource allocations for schools and school districts. Whether direct or 
indirect, high stakes can create an incentive for test cheating, which, in turn, severely 
jeopardizes the accuracy and validity of the inferences being made. Testing agencies 
and other stakeholders therefore endeavor to prevent or at least minimize the 
opportunities for test cheating by including multiple, spiraled test forms, minimizing 
item exposure, proctoring, and a variety of other preventive methods. However, even 
the best test prevention methods cannot totally eliminate cheating. For example, even 
if exposure is minimized, there is still some chance for a highly motivated group of 
examinees to collaborate to gain prior access to the exposed test items. Cheating 
detection methods, therefore, are developed as a complement to monitor and identify 
test cheating, afterward.  
There is a fairly strong research base of statistical cheating detection methods. 
However, many existing statistical cheating detection methods are in applied settings.  
This dissertation proposes a novel statistical cheating detection model, called the 
Deterministic, Gated Item Response Theory Model (DGIRTM). As its name implies, 
the DGIRTM uses a statistical gating mechanism to decompose observed item 
performance as a gated mixture of a true- proficiency function and a response 
function due to cheating. The gating mechanism and specific choice of parameters in 
the model further allow estimation of a statistical cheating effect at the level of 
individual examinees or groups (e.g., individual suspected of collaborating). 
Extensive simulation research was carried out to demonstrate the DGIRTM’s 
characteristics and power to detect cheating. These studies rather clearly show that 
this new model may significantly improve our capability to sensitively detect and 
proactively respond to instances of test cheating.
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High-stakes tests are widely used in education, professional certification and 
licensure, employment, and other settings. Most tests are employed to make 
inferences about test takers’ proficiency, achievement, competence or knowledge. The 
stakes may be direct or indirect. For example, direct high stakes testing might link test 
scores to a set of standards and cut scores for obtaining a high-school diploma, being 
granted a professional license or certificate, etc.. Other examinations such as the 
Graduate Record Examination, the Test of English as a Second Language, and the 
ACT Assessment, are used for college entrance and/or placement, where scores take 
on a very competitive flavor. Indirect stakes may include state accountability where 
test results are partially included in course grades but also tied to financial resource 
allocations for teachers, schools, and school districts. Whether direct or indirect, the 
high stakes can create an obvious incentive for test cheating. In turn, cheating 
severely jeopardizes the accuracy and validity of the inferences being made by a wide 
variety of stake-holders, including other students, parents, schools, policymakers, 
teachers, testing organizations (Cizek, 1999)
Ideally, test cheating should be prevented from happening altogether or the 
cheaters otherwise definitively identified so that appropriate inferences can be made 
which differentiate test takers on the knowledge and skills of interest, rather than 
access to illicitly acquired test materials and/or a propensity to cheat. Detection of test 
cheating is really independent of the policies that guide actions or sanctions applied to 
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cheaters. For example, in cases of individual cheating beyond the shadow of 
reasonable doubt, a sanction of disbarment from the test for a period of years may be 
imposed. When widespread cheating is evident, a remedial action may be to cancel all 
scores and require every examinee to retest.  
To some extent, test cheating can be prevented by reducing the possibility for 
cheaters to gain prior access to the test materials, or by reducing the likelihood that 
they will have access to memorized materials or other sources (Luecht, 1998; Cizek, 
1999). Obvious preventive measures include administrating multiple test forms with 
unique items, increasing the size of item bank and frequently updating items in the 
bank in computer-based test (CBT) environment, or otherwise obfuscating the items 
by any variety of scrambling strategies. Unfortunately, the implied strategy of adding 
test forms to reduce exposure has serious cost implications in terms of printing and 
logistics, and updating or otherwise increasing the size of item banks has both 
significant operational cost and technical psychometric calibration implications.  
Test cheating can also be examined on a post hoc basis—that is, during or 
sometime after the test administration— where the goal is to detect by observational 
methods or various statistical indices those individuals who are likely to have cheated. 
For example, if a test taker is observed by a proctor to have been looking at a 
neighbor’s answer sheet, we would have observational evidence of cheating. If the 
examinee performs statistically better on that section of the examination where the 
“cheating” was observed than on other sections of the test, we would have
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corroborating statistical evidence. It needs to be recognized that cheating detection, at 
best, is largely a matter of building a compelling case of evidence. 
Because of the practical limitations of preventive cheating methods—for example, 
having sufficient unique items and test forms to allow secure testing with minimum 
exposure over a three-month period—reliable post hoc test cheating detection 
methods are gaining popularity in the testing industry. Most of the cheating detection 
methods are statistical in nature. Examples include gain-score statistics where 
significantly large, observed score gains over testing events, testing days, or across 
sections of examination might serve as a “trigger” for addition investigation. The 
obvious limitation here is that there needs to be sufficient data to form a baseline for 
comparison and multiple scoring events to provide within-person comparisons.  
Other cheating detection methods rely on patterns of responses—especially incorrect 
responses (e.g., longest matched string of identical incorrect responses, incorrect 
response matches for item options having low conditional probabilities of 
selection)—where statistical flags indicate extremely unlikely selections (e.g., Frary, 
1977; Cizek, 1999; Wollack, 2006). Most of these types of cheating detection indices 
have the limitation of requiring plausible source data for the comparisons. In cases 
such as computerized adaptive testing (CAT), where different examinees are 
administered different items, it is almost impossible to identify a plausible source, 




Other detection methods make rather strong assumptions which can be logically 
and easily violated in real settings. For example, Segall’s (2002) cheating detection 
model assumes that every cheater correctly answers the subject items with 100 
percent certainty. The reality is that even the best cheaters, especially those who 
otherwise do not have the requisite knowledge and skills to perform well on their own, 
have possibly incomplete representations of the answers. When this assumption is 
wrong, it can be shown to reduce the detection power of the statistic.   
Still other methods are potentially flawed by methodology design considerations.  
For example, various person fit indices (Nering, 1997) tend to lose some statistical 
power to detect test cheating when a large proportion of the examinee population is 
involved in collaboration or other types of cheating. Also, because these types of fit 
indices merely suggest aberrant response patterns, proving that some illicit and 
perhaps even unknown cheating behavior is the primary cause of the pattern may be 
difficult. 
Segall (2002) stated, “What is lacking from existing psychometric methods is an 
accurate procedure for measuring the level and severity of test-compromise from 
operational test data collected in on-demand testing programs.”(p.165). In large part, 
this limitation stems from a lack of conditioning data (e.g., no plausible way of 
identifying potential sources of the cheating, or having insufficient connectivity in the 
data to isolate particular gain scores or aberrant response patterns). Most 
organizations involved in high-stakes testing are fairly certain that test cheating or 
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compromise—usually by item over-exposure and memorization—now widely occurs 
especially when many of the same items and test forms must be exposed to 
accommodate on-demand computer-based testing (CBT). Most of the exposure risks, 
in turn, stem from the seating capacity and scheduling limitations of CBT (Luecht, 
2005; Drasgow, Luecht, and Bennett, 2006). The simple fact is that the existing 
statistical cheating detection methods cannot efficiently detect all but the most 
obvious types of test cheating or compromise under many of the practical constraints 
of CBT.  
The Deterministic, Gated Item Response Theory Model (DGIRTM) proposed in 
this dissertation avoids the limitations of insufficient conditioning variables by using 
each examinee’s own pattern of responses as the basis of comparison. In that sense, 
the DGIRTM shares something with person fit indices (e.g., Meijer, 1996; Nering, 
1997). However, the DGIRTM also introduces an empirically known item exposure 
variable that helps logically infer a source of the aberrant responding, and additional 
assumptions about the directionality (i.e., cheaters tends to have a higher level of 
probability to correctly answer the items on which have been cheated than their 
original level determined by the real proficiency) of the response probability that 
jointly improve the detection power of the statistic. Most appealing is that that 
DGIRTM is capable of directly estimating the magnitude of the effect due to cheating 
and allows for independent estimation of the examinees’ true proficiency, without the 
influence of cheating. This effect can be aggregated across groups or populations for 
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other purposes (i.e., to approximate the cost of cheating for a group of collaborators or 
to assess whether some exposure risk threshold has been reached for an item bank).  
Furthermore, the DGIRTM is designed to address test cheating or compromise caused 
by item over-exposure, item memorization, item preview, or internet collaboration. 
Given some initial research with the model’s consistency and, accuracy of detection, 
and the apparent practical utility of information provided by this model, it seems to be 
a promising tool for practitioners to detect test cheating by either individuals or 
groups.  
Specifically, the merits of the DGIRTM are addressed in this dissertation using 
simulation studies. The studies obviously do not “prove” the value of the model, since 
none of the data are real. However, the simulation studies do help answer two 
fundamental research questions relative to the DGIRTM. First, how accurately and 
efficiently can the parameters of the DGIRTM be estimated? This question involves 
the feasibility of postulating a rather mathematically complex “mixture” IRT model.  
A Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimator is introduced that appears to 
function as expected to estimate all of the parameters of the DGIRTM. Second, how 
does the DGIRTM perform in terms of its sensitivityFF1FF and specificityFF2FF? 
Chapter 2 reviews some of the salient literature on test cheating and provides a 
taxonomy of some of the existing of statistical cheating detection methods. Chapter 3 
includes a detailed introduction to the DGIRTM by including its philosophy and 
                                                              
1  Sensitivity: the proportion of true cheaters who are correctly identified as cheaters by the model 
2 Specificity: the proportion of true non-cheaters who are correctly classified as non-cheaters by the model 
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origin, a detailed explanation on its parameters, the MCMC estimation algorithm and 
other relevant conceptual features of the model. This chapter further lays out the 
details of an intensive simulation study designed to illustrate the reliability and 
detection power of the DGIRTM under a variety of design conditions (e.g., the 
composition of cheating population, the number of cheaters, the number of items 
being cheated and the different degree of cheating on each cheated items, cheating 
effectiveness). Chapter 4 summarizes the results of this simulation research. Chapter 5 
includes a discussion of the significance of the findings, limitations of the model and 





In this chapter, the definition, consequence and causes of test cheating are 
introduced, followed by a discussion on the necessity of diverse methodologies to 
prevent and detect test cheating. Next, three categories of existing test cheating 
detection methods (copying indices, person-fit indices and cheating model) are 
reviewed, including a discussion of the methodological design considerations, as well 
as the strengths and weaknesses of each method.   
13B12BUnderstanding Test Cheating 
Tests and other assessments often have evaluative purposes that create “stakes” 
for the individual test-taker/candidate or other consumers of the scores. Simply stated, 
the examination stakes for an individual or group might provide an incentive to cheat.  
For example, if a college scholarship is awarded for any student who achieves a 
particular test score, the financial incentive should be obvious. That is not to say that 
all students cheat, given the incentive, merely that there usually needs to be some type 
of incentive or motivation to cheat—even if that incentive is related to social standing 
among one’s peers or some other less-direct motivation. 
Cizek (1999) provided one of the first comprehensive treatments of test cheating. 
As he pointed out, educators, policymakers, schools, parents, teachers, employers or 
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students make their judgments, evaluations and inferences primarily based on the 
results derived by tests. Depending on the stakes, any of these groups could be 
directly or indirectly involved in and/or affect by cheating. For example, test scores 
have been used as an indicator of teaching quality and educational program efficiency 
in the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) program, as well as for other 
accountability-related purposes. Given the financial resources and potential sanctions 
tied to NCLB and state accountability, individual schools or entire districts are not 
immune from the incentive to possibly cheat in subtle or not-so-subtle ways. Nor are 
these constituencies immune from the effects of cheating, especially if resources are 
allocated or policies enacted on the basis of data that may contain sizeable numbers of 
test cheaters. Separate from accountability purposes, parents might decide whether to 
send their children to a school or college using that institutions prior, average test 
scores as important indicators of teaching quality or college preparedness training.  
Many state accountability systems also tie teacher raises or annual bonuses to test 
results or “growth” on state-sponsored assessments. There are extremely powerful 
incentives for teachers to demonstrate progress and those are the stakes. The point is 
that incentives or motivations to cheat, facilitate cheating, or simply ignore it, are not 
always limited to individual students or test takers. 
Most testing companies or agencies responsible for large-scale testing programs 
take a great care and dedicate extensive resources to ensuring the validity and 
accuracy of scores, decisions, and other proficiency-based interpretations made on the 
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basis of test performance. When performance reflects nefarious behaviors beyond the 
required innate intelligence and learned knowledge and skills measured by a 
particular assessment, the validity of that assessment is seriously threatened. 
Inferences about proficiency in the presence of even partial cheating are no longer 
accurate. In fact, the test results and evaluation of proficiency for the individuals or 
groups involved in cheating are actually misleading.  
The negative impact of test cheating tends to grow in proportion to two factors: (1) 
the extent of cheating (how many are cheating?) and (2) the severity (how much 
advantage is gained?). The impact of cheating may also be extensive, given the chain 
of events that follow. For example, suppose a small group of individuals cheat on a 
college entrance test and obtain test scores substantially above their true proficiency 
levels. A university admits those students. What is the impact? First, those students 
may have taken up admission slots and financial resources that should have gone to 
other, more deserving students. Second, if the test is indeed predictive of 
post-secondary school success, these same students are likely to require more 
remedial resources and may still fail the more strenuous courses or take longer to 
eventually graduate with mediocre grades, at best (unless, of course, they become 
career cheaters). 
Although the impact of test cheating is well-recognized, it remains a serious 
challenge uncover all types of test cheating, much less to develop proactive and 
reactive techniques for combating cheating. As Cizek (1999) explained, test cheating 
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can involve individuals as well as groups. The most obvious types of cheating involve 
using some “source”—other than innate intelligence and learned knowledge or skills 
measured by the test—to respond to test items. Cheating sources can include stolen 
answer sheets acquired from others, posted test questions and answers on a website, a 
telephone or text conversation with an outside source during the examination, or 
merely looking at somebody else’s responses. Cheating can also involve the 
acquisition and dissemination of test materials; for example, putting memorized test 
items from an active test form on a website, taking photos on online test questions 
with a mini-camera, etc.. Cheating can also occur when an outside source—other than 
the examinee(s)—intervenes to change responses. Individuals in the testing industry 
have many anecdotal stories about test administrators with some direct or indirect 
stakes in the examination results changing answers for certain students. It is 
interesting to note that, similar to popular crime scene investigation terminology, the 
phrase “test data forensics” is now being used to describe many of the investigative 
and analytical procedures used by testing agencies to explore the likelihood of 
cheating.   
In the 21th century, test cheating has become a high-tech endeavor. Recording 
equipment, such as micro-recorders, cell phones, button-sized still cameras, or digital 
capture software are all useful for facilitating test cheating. For example, a group of 
test takers might use tiny still cameras to photograph entire test booklets, and then sell 
those test items to others who post the items and likely answers on a pay-per-view 
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website. Examinees who do not have access to the website (i.e., who do not pay) are 
unfairly disadvantaged. Modern technology has therefore extended the boundaries of 
cheating from inside a particular test administration site (e.g., a proctored testing 
center) to anyone with access to an internet connection and a credit card number. This 
challenge of using the internet and is the world-wide boundaries greatly complicates 
the identification of sources of cheating as well as locating the recipients (cheaters). 
 A cheater does not really have any advantage or potential gain if (s)he never sees the 
test questions memorized or that the person otherwise had access to. In that regard, if 
we have sufficiently large item banks and sufficient numbers of test forms to keep the 
data moving in an apparent random or near random pattern, cheaters will not have any 
particular advantage because the test questions acquired from a particular source have 
only a very tiny likelihood of being seen. Unfortunately, in reality, two factors in the 
testing industry tend to limit the size of the item banks and the number of test forms, 
increasing the exposure of test items and forms to potential cheaters (Luecht, 1996, 
2005). The first factor is test administration seat capacity. Since the advent of 
large-scale, group testing in World War II, many educational and professional 
certification and licensure testing agencies have held large-scale testing events in 
auditoriums, classrooms, and any other available spaces. Proctoring is provided at the 
testing sites and, by testing on only one or two dates each year, extreme exposure is 
limited. In these situations, it is possible to use a smaller number of test forms and 
random spiraling of the forms to individuals to limit the exposure of potential cheaters 
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to examination materialsFF3FF. However, given the pressures of modernization, many 
testing agencies are now considering and, in some cases, forces by economics and 
political pressures to adopt computer-based testing (CBT). CBT requires a “computer 
seat” for each examination and, given the limitations of most secure CBT providers, 
the large-scale testing events of the past are no longer possible. Instead, the tests may 
be offered 24-7, 365 days per year, or during discrete testing windows, ranging from a 
week to several months. The longer the window or testing period is, the greater will 
be the exposure of available test materials (Luecht, 1996, 2005).   
The second factor is the cost of producing items and associated test materials. 
Professionally developed items reportedly cost between $300 and $1,500 each to 
design, pilot, calibrate, and eventually use on operational test forms (Luecht, personal 
communication). If, for example, we determined that we needed ten times as many 
items to support CBT administrations within four discrete windows each year, with 
uniform exposures per window, the cost of test production would correspondingly 
increase by a factor of ten. There are few apparent economical benefits of scaling up 
production. And, furthermore, generating test items is not the same as stamping out 
parts on a manufacturing assembly line. Test developers at most testing agencies 
would be hard pressed to suddenly be capable of generating ten times as many high 
quality items, not to mention the experimental pilots/try outs and sampling design 
issues related to item calibration for use in scoring (Luecht, 1996; Stocking, Ward & 
                                                              
3Agencies involved in national (U.S.) and international testing still must contend with testing across time zones 
and even across the international date line. 
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Potenza, 1996; Segall, 2002; Luecht, 2005). Due to these types of practical cost 
limitations, many test agencies are therefore forced to expose smaller-than-desired 
item pools over greater periods of time, making it possible for “examinee 
collaboration networks” to systematically acquire and disseminate the test questions 
to potential cheaters (Luecht,1996). 
Testing organizations endeavor to prevent test cheating through the test 
development and administration process by imposing strict security regulations, 
training of their employees, and monitoring of people and materials using various 
quality control mechanisms and cross-checks. Yet, test cheating can never be totally 
prevented, with certainty, despite the best security and quality control. One effective 
way of preventing cheating is to control the environment through standardization, 
including limiting what the examinees can bring into the testing environment, as well 
as using proctors and electronic surveillance measures. Trained human proctors have 
been effectively used for decades to observe and monitor test takers while they are 
taking a test, and can provide direct testimony and evidence of cheating such as overt 
copying or accessing an unauthorized source. However, even the most astute proctors 
are limited by what they can observe. For example, most proctors would be unable to 
see a tiny receiver embedded in an examinee’s ear canal or notice carefully executed 
text messaging on a small cell phone. Proctoring also depends on human judgment 
and is subject to all of the limitations of subjectivity. If a proctor chooses to ignore 
certain types of minor cheating activities, the potential cheating goes unreported. If 
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the proctor is overly strict in his/her interpretation, false accusations could arise, 
raising into question the legitimacy of the proctoring. Or, if the proctor or his/her 
supervisor chooses to confront suspects, other innocent students might be upset and 
nervous and unable to focus on their tests (Cizek, 1999).   
Statistical cheating detection methods provide a more reactive way to catch 
cheaters after the fact. Most statistical cheating detection methods are objective, as 
well as being cost/ time-efficient. Three categories of statistical test cheating detection 
methods (copying indices, cheating detection model and person fit indices) are 
reviewed in the following sections, with discussions of their strengths and 
weaknesses.  
14B13BReview on Existing Statistical Cheating Detection Methods 
Angoff (1974) and Frary (1977) were two of the first researchers to investigate 
and publish works on the detection of test cheating. However, extensive research on 
cheating—especially research conducted by the major testing companies and other 
agencies involved in operational testing—has often not been published for the simple 
reason of security. That is, if statistical detection methods are published and widely 
disseminated, copiers may discover ways to reduce the effectiveness of those 
techniques. Cizek (1999) can be credited with opening up this topic to more 
wide-spread dialogue and research interest with the publication of his book, Cheating 
on Tests: How to Do It, Detect It, and Prevent It.  
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Most of the existing statistical cheating detection methods can be divided into 
three categories: (1) answer copying indices; (2) cheating detection models that 
directly estimate test cheating levels or effects; and (3) person fit indices that identify 
unusual response patterns, without necessarily specifying the causes. Copying indices 
(specifically, Wollack’s ω, Holland’s K index, and Sotaridona’s S indices) are 
reviewed first, followed by Segall’s cheating detection model. Finally, some typical 
person fit indices are discussed (e.g., lz index and ECI indices).  
29B28BStatistical Answer Copying Indices 
Test answer copying is one of the most obvious types of test cheating, where one 
examinee copies the answers from one or more other examinees. The source of the 
copying may or may not be a willing participant in the cheating. Most answer copying 
indices are designed to identify test cheaters based on some policy-based thresholds 
related to the statistical significance level or likelihood of the similarities between the 
response patterns of two examinees under suspicion (cheater and source). Given a 
very unlikely-by-chance level of similarity between two examinees’ response patterns, 
the plausible inference is that one of two examinees copied the answers of the other 
examinee. There is a plethora of answer copying indices from which to choose (e.g.,  
Bellezza & Bellezza, 1989; Frary, Tideman, &Watts, 1977; Hanson, Harris, & 
Brennan, 1987; Holland, 1996; Watson, Iwamoto, , Nungester, & Luecht, 1998; 
Sotaridona & Meijer, 2002, 2003;Wollack, 1997, 2003;Wollack & Cohen,1998; 
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Wollack, Cohen, & Serlin, 2001), and most of those indexes have been demonstrated 
to have differential effectiveness, given the nature of the data used and assumptions 
made about the nature of the copying (Wollack, 2006). 
Cizek (1999) classified answer copying indices as two types: (1) methods that use 
a theoretical distribution to compute the likelihood of observing the similarity by 
chance, called Type I copying indices; and (2) methods that use one or more reference 
samples of examinees taking the same test to estimate the likelihoods of observing 
particular similarities or response patterns, called Type II copying indicesFF4FF. It should 
be noted that most of the detection methods shown treat incorrect answers on 
multiple-choice questions as equally likely (i.e., all are scored wrong and the scored 
dichotomous data is sufficient for the detection analysis). There are exceptions (see, 
for example, Angoff, 1974; Watson, Iwamoto, Nungester, & Luecht, 1998), that 
condition on the actual incorrect choices selected. However, nothing germane to the 
present research study is gained by reviewing those more elaborate methods of 
analysis. They are mentioned only in the spirit of completeness.  
As for Type I Answer Copying Indices, generally speaking, any computed 
similarity index or indicator— such as counts of similarities or the length of strings of 
identical incorrect responses—can be viewed as having a particular sampling 
distribution. The probability of observing the computed statistic of interest is 
estimated by using a theoretical distribution such as the unit-normal cumulative 
                                                              
4  These labels should not be confused with Type I and II statistic errors of inference. 
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z-distribution, a t-distribution, or some other plausible sampling distribution.  
Comparing the observed (computed) statistic to its theoretical sampling distribution 
constitutes a significance test of the null hypothesis that the observed similarity 
between the potential copier and the source is strictly due to chance. Rejection of that 
hypothesis suggests an alternative, plausible hypothesis that the similarity between the 
two examinees’ response pattern could only have occurred due to one examinee 
copying from the other. The nominal significance level is typically set at a very 
conservative value (i.e., 1.0E-7) to minimize false-positives. Adjustments of 
experimental decisions errors can also be used if the number of hypothesis tests is 
large.  
Ultimately, those examinees with significant results are identified as potential 
copiers (who copy answers from others) or sources (whose answers are copied by the 
copiers). Wollack’s  (1997) and Frary’s g2 index (1977) are the two examples of 
Type I answer copying indices reviewed below. (See Wollack [1997] for a more 
comprehensive review of answer copying indices.) 
Wollack (1997) characterizes answer copying as involving two types of 
examinees: (1) the “source”, represented by s, whose answers are copied by others; 
and (2) ”copier”, represented by the index c, who copies the source’s answers. 
Wollack’s notation hcs is used to represent the number of matching item responses 




Wollack’s cheating index uses item response theory (IRT), where both the test 
items and examinees are calibrated to a common metric, using a suitable IRT model 
for dichotomous items. The conditional expectation of hcs is the sum of conditional 
probabilities, using the IRT model probabilities, pi≡Prob(ui=1|θ) and qi≡1-pi:  
, , ∑    (1) 
where:  is a vector representing the IRT item parameter estimates;  is the 
copier’s latent ability or proficiency score;  is the source’s response pattern on 
i=1,…,k items;  is the source’s response an individual item, i; pi is the probability 
of a correct answer to the ith item given the copier’s ability; qi is the probability of 
incorrect answer to the ith item—i.e., the complement of pi. Using the binomial 
distribution, Wollack provides the conditional variance of the estimates about the 
expected value, hcs , as 
∑                                                              (2) 
The answer copying index, Wollack’s , is therefore a simple ratio of observed 
deviations about the expected value to the standard error of estimate: 
, ,     .                                                     (3) 
The null hypothesis for the significance test assumes that ω follows a 
unit-normal distribution (i.e., a Gaussian distribution). If the value of  of an 
examinee is greater than or equal to the critical unit-normal value at the nominal 
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significance level, the copier can be identified as a potential cheater, otherwise, the 
examinee is not flagged. For example, given a nominal significance level of 0.001, the 
corresponding inverse normal critical value would be 3.09 (using absolute value). Any 
copiers have computed values |3.09| would be flagged as potential copiers, 
requiring additional follow-up. 
Frary’s (1977) g2 is conceptually similar to Wollack’s IRT-based index, but only 
requires classical test theory statistic such as number-correct scores and item-level 
p-values. Frary’s method also classifies one examinee as the source (represented by s) 
and the other one is the copier (represented by c). Here, hcs is the observed number of 
shared, identical responses between the source and copier. The expected value of hcs is 
defined as:   
 | ∑                                                      (4) 
where: k is the number of items; Uis is the source’s response to the ith item; Pc(Uis) is 
the copiers’ response probability to have the same response as the source on the ith 
item. Frary (1977 provides extensions of the index that allow other features of the 
response pattern to be used (e.g., incorrect strings) calculate Pc(Uis). The variance of 
the  |  is defined as: 
∑ 1   .                                          (5) 
The test statistic is computed as 
ℎ  |
                                                          (6) 
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Like Wollack’s ω, Frary’s g2 is assumed to be normally distributed with mean of 
zero and standard deviation one. The null hypothesis of this statistic is: H0: g2=μ=0.  
If g2 exceeds absolute value of the critical z-value at the nominal significance 
threshold, the subject would be flagged for additional follow-up.  
The  and g2 indices are highly similar, but employ a different statistical 
mechanism to define the expected coincidence of responses. As noted above, the  
index is IRT-based while the g2 index is classical test theory-based. The advantage of 
these two indices is that they both make use of the full [scored] response vectors 
including both the correct and incorrect answers. However, both indices are somewhat 
limited in accuracy, for more extreme scores and lose substantial statistical power as 
the copier and source have greater numbers of shared responses. With the  index, 
the copiers’ estimated proficiency will be positively or negatively inflated by 
including the copied responses in the full response string. A substantial increase in the 
number of test cheaters (copiers in the population) could increase the magnitude of 
the scale difference between the estimated examinees’ scores (with cheating) and 
examinees’ real proficiency scores, as measured by θ. Consequently, the expected 
coincidence (similarity) of responses would be contaminated and drift away from the 
true value, resulting in a non-centrality shift in the sampling distribution of ω. The 
critical implication is that computed   statistic would no longer be normally 
distributed with mean of zero and standard deviation one. If we could estimate the 
non-centrality shift, a corrected sampling distribution could be used; however, a 
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plausible statistical non-centrality adjustment method has not been offered in the 
literature. 
Frary’s g2 is based on the observed data to calculate the expected number of 
coincident responses. This index itself will be greatly impacted by the population and 
item characteristics (classical item difficulties and discrimination indices). A 
fundamental limitation is that, similar to Wollack’s index, the g2 statistic does not 
distinguish an examinee’s true ability from that ability plus some incremental gain due 
to cheating, and is therefore susceptible to the same non-centrality shift as ω, when 
the number of copiers increases substantially.  
In summary, Type I answer copying indices such as Wollack’s ω and Frary’s g2 
have the advantage of making use of all of the responses (both incorrect and correct 
responses). As discussed below, broadly considering all the responses may be an 
advantage when compared to the Type II indices. However, the Type I copying indices 
tend to lose power and can lead to biased results when the magnitude of the cheating 
effectiveness or the number of cheaters in the population increases because these 
methods do not distinguish any examinee’s true proficiency and associated responses 
from the portion of the response affected by cheating. Furthermore, the assumption 
that the counts of coincident responses due to cheating or other forms of collaboration  
are normally distributed may be violated, rendering the use of a Gaussian probability 




As opposed to Type I Copying Indices, Holland’s K index (1996) and 
Sotaridona’s S index (2002)，are representative examples of the Type II copying 
indices. Both indexes assume that the similarity between the response patterns of 
copiers and sources can be modeled by using either the Binominal or Poisson 
distributions.  
Holland’ K could be implemented by either using an empirical sampling 
distribution or a theoretical distribution. For both implementations, the examinees are 
divided into some number of groups, denoted R, based on the number of wrong 
answers. Each group has the same number of wrong answer which is labeled as Wr. 
For example, all of the examinees having only one incorrect answer form Group 1, all 
of the examinees having two incorrect answers form Group 2, etc.. As with the Type I 
indices, there is a source student, labeled by s, whose answers may have been copied. 
The label rj is used to represent that the jth examinee from the rth group.  
For the empirical implementation, Kj is defined as the observed proportion of 
examinees in one subgroup (Rc) who having the same number of incorrect answer as 
the jth examinee and the examinees in the subgroup whose matching number of 
incorrect answer with the source is at least as large as the jth examinee (Sotaridona, 
2005). Specifically, Kj is defined as  
Kj= 
∑ I  ,                                                               (7) 
where n is the total number of examinees in the sub-group (Rc) that have the same 
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number of incorrect answers with the jth examinee, and i represents the ith examinee in 
the sub-group. The variable Iij is a binary indicator that is set to zero when Mis<Mjs, or  
Iij= 1when Mi>=Mj. where Mis is the matching number of incorrect answer of ith 
examinee in that sub-group with the source. Mjs is the matching number of incorrect 
answer of jth examinee with the source. 
A small value of Kj means that the jth examinee may have taken the opportunity to 
cheat in the test by copying strings of responses. That is, the logical directionality of 
the test links possible copying with decreasing values of Kj. However, the count of 
matching incorrect items is sensitive to the ability level of both the copier and source. 
For example, if the copier and source are at the same ability level, they would be 
expected to have a relatively high number of identical matching number of incorrect 
answers.  As a result, more innocent test takers at similar ability levels might be 
misclassified as copiers using this index. In addition, this method is sample size 
dependent because the number of examinees in a particular subgroup is involved in 
this index, especially for the empirical implementation. 
For the theoretical implementation, the probability of the suspect having at least 
as large matching number of incorrect answers with the source as other examinees in 
the same subgroup is modeled using the binominal distribution. The number of 
matching wrong answer between the examinee rj and the source (s) is labeled as Mrj. 
Thus the K defined by Holland (1996) is:  
K ∑ 1        (8) 
25 
 
where p is the expected probability of wrong answer matching, Ws is the number of 
wrong answers of the source. Note that p can be estimated in different ways. One of 
the more direct methods is to define p as  where  is the mean number of 
matched wrong answers between all the examinees from the rth group and the source. 
Holland also suggested a linear regression method of approximating p.  This 
regression approach uses the proportion of wrong answers (Qr) of each examinee in 
each subgroup as the predictor variable. Holland (1996) provided an example to show 
how the p was predicted using linear regression:  
a bQ ,                                       0 0.3
a 0.3b 0.4b Q 0.3 ,   0. 3 1 . (9) 
As a practical note, a and b must be pre-specified or otherwise estimated applying 
the conditional two-part regression models, based on Qr. For example, Holland (1996) 
set a=0.085 and b is differently set based on specific testing settings. How these 
coefficients a and b were estimated for different testing contexts is not clearly 
presented in Holland’s study (Sotaridona, 2003). 
Modified K indices ( and ) were proposed by using all of the data from all 
the sub-groups to predict the p values using linear or polynomial regression models. 
The estimation methods of p in these two new indices is not the focus of this 





Sotaridona (2002) similarly proposed two new indices called S1 and S2 to describe 
the probability of the suspect having at least as large matching number of incorrect 
answers as other examinee in the same subgroup, based on an assumed Poisson 
probability distribution. Examinees are also divided into R subgroups based on the 
number of incorrect answers, where examinees in each subgroup have the same 
number of wrong answers. The formula for calculating S1 is defined as:  
∑
!
                                                        (10) 
Where , and and  is estimated based on the number of wrong 
answers and the mean number of matching wrong answers for each group (Wr). Ws is 
the number of wrong answer of the source (s). Mrj is the matching number of wrong 
answers between the jth examinee in the rth subgroup and the source. 
Notably, both Sotaridona’s S1 index and Holland’s K, only use the incorrect 
answers, disregarding with correct answers. In contrast, the S2 index, uses both correct 
answers and incorrect answers. It seems that S2 should be a promising copying index. 
However, it introduces a lot of other unverified transformation and factors which 
would jeopardize its reliability. For example, this index is hard to distinguish 
examinees who are competent enough to correctly answer to a certain item from those 
who correctly respond to the item by guessing or cheating. Thus a complicated 
mathematic transformation formula, which incorporates the guessing level of each 
item, is introduced to identify cheating effect embedded in the correct responses, by 
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removing the impact of guessing on the response patterns. However, such 
transformation formula is not theoretically or empirically verified so far, which is 
somewhat speculative. For more detailed information about this index, reader could 
refer to Stataridona’s work in 2003.     
In summary, the basic logic underlying these Type II indices is that a suspect who 
has a larger number of matching incorrect answer than most of other examinees in the 
same sub-group should be the one who copied answers from the source. A small value 
of both S and K indicates the high likelihood of answer copying. These two indices 
could be problematic sometimes. Firstly, it is hard to calculate the expected matching 
probability (p) for K and expected matching number (μ) for S1. Actually, some new 
methods (e.g., , ) are proposed to calculate the p and the μ; however, they are still 
unreliable and difficult to be estimated. Secondly, the Binominal or Poisson 
distribution is not theoretically validated to characterize the likelihood of the incorrect 
answer match between the suspect and source. Next, the two kinds of indices are 
easily impacted by the item difficulty, examinees’ ability and sample size of each 
subgroup. As a notice, these type II copying indices, except S2, only utilize the 
information of the matched incorrect answers, but they are preferred by practitioners  
in real settings because they seems to have higher level of power to detect test 
cheating relative copying.   
A number of other Type II cheating indices could have been included in this 
section (e.g., g1, , ,S2), but most of them make the same relative assumptions and 
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focus on essentially the same data as the indices reviewed here. The copying indices 
are particularly developed to identify test cheating caused by direct answer copying. 
Although many copying indices have been demonstrated to be useful tools to detect 
test copying, they are limited and may be unreliable in many applied settings because 
of their strong assumptions on the distribution of the similarity statistics. Wollack 
(2006) pointed out that no one existing copying index was uniformly better than 
others given different amounts of or different types of answer copying.  
30B29BCheating Detection Models 
Some researchers have chosen to focus on developing statistic models for more 
directly characterizing the severity and level of test cheating. Segall (2002) proposed 
an IRT-based cheating detection model to directly provide estimates of the population 
characteristics related to the test cheating. This model is particularly designed to 
detect test cheating caused by item exposure, item-preview, or item sharing via 
internet. The use of such models is obvious. If cheating becomes sufficiently 
problematic, change the item bank or otherwise implement changes to significantly 
reduce the benefits of prior exposure to the active item bank and test forms.   
In Segall’s (2002) model, the test items are separated into two mutually exclusive 
categories: one class of items which are probably compromised, as indicated by 
empirical exposure counts, time in use, or other indicators; the second class of items 
are considered to be secure due to recent release or other factors. Segall (2002) 
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defined the first class of items as those considered exposed to test takers beyond a 
span of a week, month, or a year, depending on empirical investigations or policy 
decisions.  
Using an IRT-based response function, the probability of a correct answer to an 
item under Segall’s test compromise model is:  
, , , , 1 1 , , , 1                    (11) 
~                                                           (12) 
                                                    (13) 
P , , , = 1    (14) 
where Kij is the cheating status of the jth examinee on the ith item (where kij= 1 denotes 
prior exposure of that item to that particular examinee and kij= 0 denotes lack of 
exposure). The jth examinee’s cheating tendency  is hierarchically modeled by a 
normal ogive model with a person parameter ωj and item parameters αi and βi . The 
parameter  for the ith item is assumed to be known such that  = 1 for exposed 
items,  = 0 for unexposed items. Equation 13 is the usual three-parameter 
normal-ogive IRT model for the probability of a correct response of the jth examinee 
to the ith item, with examinee ability  and item parameters ,  and .  
Compared with copying indices, Segall’s model has two distinctive advantages, 
from an explanatory perspective. One advantage is that, in addition to modeling the 
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test takers’ proficiencies and item operating characteristics under non-cheating 
conditions, it includes population-level characteristics related to test compromise. 
This provides actionable information to signal a testing agency of potentially high 
risks of cheating and suggest the need to introduce a new item bank or less-exposed 
test forms. The other advantage is the model makes use of the full [scored] response 
matrix, including all examinees. In contrast, most of the answer copying indices 
compare response similarities of only pairs of examinees: the source and copier 
suspect.  
Segall’s cheating detection model does make one rather strong assumption that 
may limit its flexibility and, possibly, its statistical power to correctly classify 
examinees and estimate the magnitude of the cheating in the population. That 
assumption is that the test cheater will correctly answer every item on which have 
been cheated with 100 percent certainty. It is certainly reasonable to believe that test 
cheating activities should increase test cheaters’ observed performance—that is, the 
probability of correctly answering most of the items to which they had prior access.  
But, it seems highly unlikely that every examinee will memorize every exposed item 
with certainty and be able to retrieve those answers while taking the test.  If we 
suppose that many of the cheaters are motivated to cheat because they lack the 
knowledge and skills to answer the questions by honest learning/studying or innate 
intelligence, then it makes little sense to assume that those same cheaters can 
memorize and successfully recall large blocks of exposed items, at least not without 
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auxiliary aids such as hidden “cheat sheets”, access to cell/text messaging, or other 
nefarious means of getting outside help. Insofar as the model is concerned, the 
probability of correctly answering the cheated items is not determined by the cheating 
activities itself. Other factors such as each cheaters’ real proficiency level and his/her 
capability to memorize items at different levels of difficulty, given different content 
and surface features of the items, are also key factors to impact a cheater’s probability 
of correctly answering the items which have been cheated by the cheater. 
As a point of interest, the Deterministic, Gated IRT Model (DGIRTM) presented 
in this dissertation attempts to overcome that assumptive limitation by relaxing the 
assumption that cheating examinees response perfectly to every item that may have 
been previously exposed. The DGIRTM also more generally deals with the issue of 
estimating the impact of cheating (gain scores) in the population than is possible using 
Segall’s model.  
31B30BPerson Fit Indices 
An extensive number of person-fit indices (PFI) have been developed, primarily 
to evaluate the date-model fit of various IRT models.  Examples include likelihood 
ratio tests such as lo (Levine & Rubin, 1979),  lz (Drasgow, Levine,& Williams, 
1985), and ECI1z, ECI2z, ECI4z, and ECI6z (Tatsuoka, 1984; see Meijer, 1996). Only 
the lz and ECI4z are reviewed in this dissertation, because prior research rather 
conclusively suggests that these two indices are the two of most useful tools. 
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 It seems worth noting that person-fit indices are intended to detect aberrant patterns 
of responses that differ from expected responses under a particular theoretical model. 
Assuming that the model holds for the majority of examinees in a particular 
population, those examinees having highly unusual patterns can be flagged and 
further evaluated for likely causes of the aberrance. For example, consider an 
examinee getting sick during the afternoon of a full-day examination, making it 
difficulty for her to concentrate. Her item responses are likely to suffer and may more 
progressively mimic random responses toward the end of the test. The person-fit 
statistics should be capable of flagging the rather dramatic changes in the patterns of 
response, earlier versus later in the test. This example has an obvious cause that seems 
consistent with the data. Suppose that another examinee has exactly the same 
response patterns, but his performance dropped off because he no longer was able to 
cheat—perhaps he lost or inadvertently forgot to bring the final page of answers. Did 
he cheat and does the statistically determined aberrant response pattern constitute 
sufficient evidence to come to that conclusion? This simple example characterizes the 
challenge of most person-fit indices for test cheating. The power to detect aberrant 
response patterns is usually independent of possible causes and alternative 
explanations for exactly the same data with different causes.  
The lz index is a standardized ratio function of a log-likelihood function, where 
the likelihood of the observed responses are compared to an expected value for the 
population or an appropriate reference group. The lz statistic can be expressed as  
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L E  L
 L
                                                     (15) 
where the log-likelihood of the observed data is given as 
ln L θ ∑ u ln P θ 1 u ln 1 P θ                           (16) 
and with an expectation and variance defined as 
E ln L θ ∑ P θ ln P θ 1 P θ ln 1 P θ                    (17) 
and 
var ln L θ ∑ P θ 1 P θ P
P
 . (18) 
Referring to Equations 15 to 18, i represents the items,  is the ability estimate 
(assumed to be estimated by maximum likelihood), ui is the response of the ith item, 
and  is the probability of a correct item response for a given estimated of 
ability, ,  based on a particular IRT model. 
If examinees respond according to the chosen IRT model (i.e., if their data fit the 
model), lz has a sampling distribution that is asymptotically normal with a mean of 
zero and standard deviation of one. Large negative values of lz indicate misfit or 
unlikely response patterns. Large positive values indicate over-fit, an estimation result 
that rarely surfaces with real data. Some research has shown that lz is the most 
efficient at detecting non-model-fitting response patterns when the test has items of 
varied difficulty and small lower asymptote parameters (Reise & Due, 1991). Using 
simulation studies, Drasgow and Levine (1986) found that lz performed satisfactorily 
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with detection rates approximately 65 percent correct identification of simulated 
cheaters, where cheating was induced.  
 In a slightly more complicated way, ECI4z  (Tatsuoka, 1984) was designed to 
isolate the difference between an observed response vector and an IRT-based or 
response function, incorporating both the difficulty of the item and the conditional 
[binomial] variance of estimation into the ratioFF5FF. It contains information of observed 
response and model predicated probability. ECI4z is defined as:  
ECI4 ∑ P P P
∑ P P P P
       (19) 
where  is defined as the condition mean of  for a particular set of items, 
 is the model-predicted probability of a correct answer to the ith item, and  is 
the observed response of the ith item. Lewis (1999) asymptotically proven that ECI4z 
is distributed with a standardized normal distribution with a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of one. Large positive values may result from correctly answering 
more difficult items. Conversely, large negative values may result from an examinee  
correctly answering more easy items and fewer difficult items than would be expected 
on the basis of the IRT model in use.  
Despite their popularity and apparent value for general data-model misfit 
questions related to individual examinees, lz and ECI4z s may be fundamentally 
flawed for use in detecting cheaters for an obvious reason. Both of the two indices 
                                                              
5 This ECI4z statistic is conceptually very similar to other, more traditional data-model fit statistics (see for 
example., Wright & Stone, 1979 and Yen, 1983) 
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make use of the estimated ability or proficiency to calculate the likelihood values.  
However, the estimates are potentially contaminated by some unknown mixture of 
guessing, or response due to cheating, and maybe even some attempts to respond 
based on legitimate knowledge and skills. In that case, therefore, the null hypothesis 
of the two indices may not be held any more. Furthermore, when the number of 
cheaters in a test grows, the two indices may lose their power to identify unusual 
response patterns due to cheating (versus other causes). As noted above, factors other 
than test cheating may be equally or more plausible to explain aberrant responding, 
where identical aberrant responses may have vastly different explanations.  
15B14BSummary of the Cheating Detection Methods 
Three categories of statistical cheating detection methods were introduced and 
discussed in this section, with examples provided under each category. These methods 
have all been applied, at least in research settings—less so in applied testing 
settings—and generally shown to be useful tools. For example, Wollack’s (1997, 2006) 
research has suggested that the ω index consistently maintains expected level of 
statistical power and false positive error rates, even for small sample size applications. 
Segall’s model was also shown to work well with simulated cheating data.  For the 
person-fit statistics, as noted, Drasgow and Levine (1986) used simulation research to 
empirically demonstrate that the lz statistic could perform satisfactorily to help detect 
cheating that results in aberrant response patterns.  
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Because most of these detection methods require only access to the scored 
response data and sufficient computational resources, they are obviously 
cost/time-efficient; at least when compared to reviewing irregularity reports submitted 
by test proctors or carrying out extensive, physical investigations of opportunity and 
motive to cheat, as well as background checks on cheating suspects. At worst, most 
cheating analysis results provide only one type of evidence that may or may not be 
plausibly linked to suspected cheating activities. Few testing organizations would 
responsibly accuse somebody of cheating strictly based on a statistical index.  
However, even when the cheating indices produce the primary flagging mechanisms 
for suspected cheating—based almost solely on the observed data—we might 
arguably want to hold those indices to a very conservative standard to avoid falsely 
accusing individual examinees.  
As suggested in this chapter, most of the existing statistical cheating detection 
methods have various limitations—a point also made by Wollack (2006). There are 
obvious limitations such as conclusively identifying potential sources/causes and 
determining directionality, having somewhat speculative definitions of the parameters 
in some of the detection models, and a general neglect of those models to distinguish 
cheaters’ real proficiency from their proficiency due to cheating. More specifically, 
almost all of the copying indices are designed specifically to detect answer copying 
by comparing a suspected copier to a source, using similarity-based statistics.  
Although these methods have been effectively used with large-scale paper-and-pencil 
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tests, their effectiveness seems severely curtailed for many types of computerized 
tests (adaptive tests and the other types of computerized testing at many small centers 
on multiple days). For example, it is difficult to identify possible sources when most 
examinees take tests at different times and in a wider variety of locations, much less 
extract sufficient data, especially if fewer examinees ever see exactly the same items 
in the same order (Iwamoto, Nungester & Luecht, 1998).   
Cheating models such as Segall’s (2002) IRT-based cheating model might be 
limited by data demands—especially for smaller-sample applications and the 
plausibility of the rather strong assumption about the capability of cheaters to 
reproduce exposed materials with certainty. However, the inclusion of way to estimate 
the magnitude of score gain due to cheating is a particularly appealing aspect of 
Segall’s model that is extended in this dissertation. Finally, most person fit indices 
tend to confound real proficiency and proficiency due to cheating (i.e., cheating skill) 
and also suffer from sufficient explanation/proof of cheating as the cause of the 
aberrance. The lack of generalized utility of these indices and models was articulated 
by Dwyer and Hecht (1996):  
Our position, which is supported by both the courts and statisticians, is that one 
should never accept probabilistic evidence as sufficient evidence of cheating 
merely because a pattern of answers is deemed to be statistically improbable. In 
every case, reasonable competing explanations should be evaluated, limitations 
of the mechanical detection strategies must be taken into account, and the 
inherent variability in the reliability and validity of test design and 




In reality, building a probative argument for cheating is a matter of providing as 
many indicators and related, convincing evidence as possible that favors the 
hypothesis that cheating is the only plausible cause. This requires also demonstrating 
that alternative explanations or cause of the results are neither reasonable nor probable, 
in a relative sense. Most statistical models require assumptions. Those assumptions 
also need to be justified any time the model is used, not just taken on faith (or 
assumed to hold under some nebulous asymptotic statistical or mathematical theory.  
Roberts (1987) pointed out the consequence inappropriately applying statistical 
detection methods that lacking validity, saying “ To rely on statistical evidence alone 
when no observational evidence is available is not only considered poor practice…but 
requires the prosecution to prove charges of cheating based only a probability” (p.79).  
Acknowledging the apparent caveats about valid and ethical uses of test cheating 
detection methods, and a rather rich literature covering a plethora of statistical 
methods, this dissertation also recognizes the value and need to move the research 
forward in a credible and significant way. Toward that end, a new cheating detection 
model, called the Deterministic, Gated IRT Model is introduced and developed in  
Chapter 3. This new model, while certainly not immune to abuse or probative misuse, 




7B7BTHE DETERMINISTIC, GATED ITEM RESPONSE THEORY 
MODEL 
In this chapter, a new cheating detection model, called Deterministic, Gated Item 
Response Theory Model (DGIRTM), is proposed to detect and respond proactively to 
test cheating by groups, or individuals in paper-based tests (PBT) or computer-based 
tests (CBT). The new model is presented from different aspects, by describing its 
modeling philosophy, origin, mathematic equations, estimation framework, and its 
conceptual features. Then a simulation research is designed to demonstrate the 
DGIRTM’s characteristics, followed by a brief introduction a real dataset where the 
DGIRTM is applied to show its usefulness.  
16B15BThe Origin 
32B31B A New Way to Look at Test Cheating 
Test cheating, as a negative factor to impact test validity, is a long-existing and 
challenging problem for the testing industry since the first test was administrated. The 
knowledge obtained from cheating activities influences an examinee’ responses with 
respect to correctly or incorrectly answering items on which examinees cheated, and 
therefore their answers are not fully dependent on their true ability. The benefit 
40 
 
achieved by cheating is a threat to the validity and inference made based on tests. A 
growing benefit (i.e., positive or negative score gain) will result in an increased threat 
to the validity or accuracy of the inference made based on tests. Therefore, test 
cheating detection methods should be able to detect cheaters who obtain noticeable 
positive or negative benefit from test cheating, which severely jeopardizes the 
accuracy of the test inference. However, in real application it seems that it is not 
necessary to detect cheaters who actually have no or little benefit from cheating, 
because such cheaters who have no or little score gain (or benefit) accordingly have 
no or little impact on the validity or accuracy of the inference made based on tests and 
thus they could be treated as non-cheaters in most real applications. The DGIRTM 
was developed for the purpose of detecting test cheating by modeling the benefit that 
cheaters obtain from their cheating activities.  
In this new model, cheaters have two skills, the skills are their true proficiency 
determined by his/her native cognitive ability and the second skill is their cheating 
skills determined by the combination of their true proficiency in addition to the 
cheating information that they have obtained. Thus, the difference between the true 
proficiency and their cheating ability is the benefit from their cheating. As a note, 
such difference between the true proficiency and cheating ability is also called score 
gain in this dissertation. It is a normal sense to believe that the score gain due to test 
cheating is positive (i.e., cheating ability is greater than true ability). The score gain 
can be used to reflect the effectiveness of the cheaters’ cheating on tests. The validity 
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of the inference made based on tests can be jeopardized by effective cheaters with 
significantly large score gain, but is only slightly impacted by un-effective cheaters 
(those who cheat but have no or little score gain). The new model is designed to 
detect effective cheaters with a noticeable score gain.  
Conceptually, this model defines test cheaters based on the effectiveness of 
cheating activities, but not on whether cheaters have or have not conducted cheating 
activities. In other words, the model treats the test takers who are un-effective cheaters 
as non-cheaters, where an un-effective cheater may have cheated, but did not 
significantly improve his or her score in cheating. The threshold between the effective 
cheaters and non-cheaters is mainly determined by the level of measurement error-as 
determined by the DGIRTM’s estimation and the confidence level to identify test 
cheaters (i.e., a cut point for determining who are cheaters; this cutting point will be 
discussed in the model estimation section). Specifically, non-effective cheaters whose 
score gain are within the standard error of the model estimation are more likely to be 
classified as non-cheaters, and otherwise effective cheaters whose score gain is above 
the standard error of model estimation are more likely to be identified as cheaters 
under the DGIRTM framework. 
Essentially, the DGIRTM treats the un-effective cheaters’ score gain as scoring 
error. From the practical standpoint, it is safer to treat un-effective cheaters as 
non-cheaters, because the severity of the impact of their score gain on test score 
validity is at the level that is the same as the standard error of the model estimation. 
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From the statistical standpoint, it is difficult to distinguish the un-effective score gain 
from the standard error of examinee scoring. From the educational and legal 
standpoint, we would prefer to believe that test takers are honest and innocent in their 
tests unless presented with strong evidence otherwise.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, test cheating due to item preview, item memorization 
or internet collaboration now noticeably exists due the evolvement of computerized 
testing, which provides more administration windows with a higher frequency. In 
such cheating due to item preview, item memorization or internet collaboration, it is 
reasonable for us to argue that examinees are only possible to review the exposed 
items (i.e., the items have been used in previous forms) and they are impossible to 
have access to the unexposed items (i.e., the items have not been used). Generally 
speaking, the DGIRTM is developed to detect test cheating conditional on the item 
exposure status (exposed or not exposed) in a test by modeling examinees’ score gain.  
33B32BThe General Cheating Model 
A statistic model is proposed to describe test cheating context by distinguishing 
cheaters’ true proficiency from their proficiency due to cheating. The model is called 
the general cheating mode, which is the origin of the DGIRTM. In this model, two 
latent traits are used to separately characterize a cheater’s real knowledge level and 
cheating.  One is test takers’ true ability (θt), which is the latent trait to characterize 
test takers’ real knowledge level, and the other ability is their cheating ability (θc), 
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which is the latent trait to describe the examinees performance due to cheating. As a 
note, it is argued that cheating ability is a combination of examinee true ability and a 
score gain. Mathematically, the score gain (labeled by Δ) is the difference of examinee 
cheating ability and true ability (Δ=θc -θt). As stated before, in reality it is reasonable 
to believe that the score gain is greater than zero.  
Test takers will only rely on their true ability to answer items when they do not 
cheat on tests, while they will use their cheating ability to solve items when they cheat. 
Based on this logic, the expected probability of a correct answer to an item according 
to the general cheating model is defined as equation 20, equation 21 or equation 22:  
P U 1|θ , θ , I , T 1 I P U 1 θ I 1 T P U 1 θ T P U 1 θ   
(20) 
P U 1|θ , θ , I , T 1 1 1 1 1  
                                                                     (21) 
P U 1|θ , θ , I , T 1 1 1                (22) 
And  
1                                                     (23) 
1                                                     (24) 
where Tj is the jth examinee’s cheating tendency which is a parameter to represent the 
cheating degree at the examinee level, Ii is the ith item’s cheating difficulty which is a 
parameter representing how many examinees can cheat on the ith item. As a special 
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note, Tj and Ii are continuous variables in the general cheating model, where Tj is 
re-defined as a dichotomous gating variable and Ii become a dichotomous model input 
to define the item exposure status in the DGIRTM.  P U 1 θ  and P U 1 θ  
are the probability of a correct answer given an examinee’s true ability and cheating 
ability, and bi is the ith item’s difficulty.  Equation 20 and 21 are essentially 
equivalent, the difference is that equation 20 represents that test cheating is modeled 
from item prospective, and in equation 21 the test cheating is modeled from examinee 
prospective. Both equation 20 and equation 21 could be simplified into equation 22. 
The statistic model represented by equation 22 is the simplified general cheating 
model. 
The general cheating model has a mixed structure by using two latent traits to 
characterize the characteristics of each examinee. Specially, the probability of a 
correct response is defined conditional on the product of examinees’ cheating 
tendency and items’ cheating difficulty ( , in Equation 22). Given this information, 
the probability then depends on either the examinees true ability or cheating ability 
(i.e., examinees will only use their cheating ability if they are, in fact, cheaters and 
they have seen the item). In this dissertation, the measurement part of the general 
cheating model is chosen to be Rash model based, because the Rash model is 
well-accepted and applied by practitioners in real settings.   
The distinctive feature of the general cheating model is that it makes use of two 
categories of examinee’s abilities together with examinee’s cheating tendency and 
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item cheating difficulty to generally characterize test cheating contexts. Unlike the 
person fit indices, copying indices and Segall’s cheating model, the general cheating 
model provides a new philosophy to characterize test cheating. Under the general 
cheating model, when Ii decreases (i.e., the ith item becomes increasingly difficult to 
be cheated on), examinees will increasingly rely on their true ability to solve the item, 
no matter how strongly they want to cheat. In addition, when an item is easily 
assessed and cheated by examinees, examinees with a low degree of cheating 
tendency tend to answer the item using their true ability, and examines with a high 
degree of cheating tendency would like to respond to the item based on their cheating 
ability. Although the general cheating model defines an effective philosophy for 
cheating, this model is not identified. Thus, a modified cheating model, called the 
Deterministic, Gated Item Response Theory Model (DGIRTM), is derived from the 
general cheating model, which will be presented in the next section.   
17B16BThe Deterministic, Gated IRT model 
34B33BThe Parameters of the Deterministic, Gated IRT Model  
The Deterministic, Gated IRT model (DGIRTM) is still based on a Rash model 
that is conditional on whether a person is a cheater or a non-cheater by using a set of 
two abilities (true ability and cheating ability) to characterize cheaters real knowledge 
and cheating severity, but Tj and Ii are modified to fix the estimation indeterminacy of 
the general cheating model.  The DGIRTM is defined as equation 25:  
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P U 1 P Uij 1 θt




1                                                     (26) 
1                                                     (27) 
where θt is the true ability determined by examinee’s cognitive nature, θc is the 
cheating ability determined by examinees’ cheating skill (a combination of true ability 
and score gain), bi is the item difficulty and ф is the logistic function . Tj in equation 
25 is not continuous parameter any more as it defined in the general cheating model. 
It is an indicator, or gated, variable used to label cheating status which is defined as:  
Tj=
1, when cheating
0, when no cheating                                                      (28) 
where Tj=1 represents that the jth examinee cheats when given the opportunity, and 
Tj=0 represents that the jth examinee does not cheat. No middle phase between 
cheating and non-cheating exists in the DGIRTM. The Tj is called a gated variable 
because it classifies examinees into two groups (cheating and non-cheating group). 
When an examinee obtains a noticeable score gain from their cheating activities, the 
gated variable Tj will assign him or her to the cheating group, he or she will remain in 
the non-cheating group otherwise. The tendency of assigning examinees into the 
cheating group increases when their score gain increases.  
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The second modification to the general cheating model is that the latent variables  
Ii in equation 25 is now defined as model input that describes item status with respect 
to possible exposure (i.e., possibility that cheaters can cheat on this item). Note that Ii 
can be dichotomously or continuously defined based on specific applied settings. In 
the continuous case, Ii is the probability that an examinee cheats on the ith item in 
general. For example, Mcleod, Lewis & Thissen (2003) made an assumption that item 
cheating difficulty has a non-linear relationship with item-difficulty, which is defined 
in equation (29): 
|
 
                                                         (29) 
where bi is the ith item’s difficulty; |  refers to the probability of the ith item 
being memorized given its item difficulty. Such probability of being memorized could 
be used as Ii to represent the items’ cheating difficulty. Other reasonable assumptions 
with respect to item cheating difficulty could be incorporated into this model as a way 
to identify cheaters according to specific needs.  
The variable Ii can also be dichotomously defined relative to item status. 
Specifically, Ii can be used to specify item exposure status, which is defined as:  
1, if exposed
0, if unexposed                                                          (30) 
where Ii =1 means that the ith item has been exposed, and Ii=0 means that the ith item 
has not been exposed. The dichotomous definition of Ii implies that items have been 
divided into two categories: exposed items and unexposed items. Empirically, 
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examinees could only have beneficial information of those exposed items, but no 
chance to assess item information of those unexposed items. As stated previously, it is 
argued that score difference between the exposed items and unexposed items should 
be due to test cheating by the item over-exposure or item preview. In this dissertation, 
the dichotomous definition of Ii is adopted because the exposure information about 
items is easily accessed by practitioners in real settings. 
As a demonstration, when Tj=1 and Ii=1, P(Uij=1|θt, θc, bi, Tj)=P(Uij=1|θc, 
bi),which implies that when examinees cheat and the items have been exposed, the 
probability that the jth examinee correctly answers the ith item is defined by that 
examinee’s cheating ability. When Tj=1 and Ii=0, P(Uij=1|θt, θc, bi, Tj)=P(Uij=1|θt, bi), 
which means that the probability that the jth examinee correctly answers the ith item is 
defined by his true proficiency, because the jth examinee could not cheat on an 
unexposed item although he wants to cheat.  In addition, when Tj=0 and Ii=1, 
P(Uij=1|θt, θc, bi, Tj)=P(Uij=1|θt, bi), which means that the probability of a correct 
answer is defined by the jth examinee’s true ability, because the jth examinee does not 
want to cheat although he has chance to cheat on the ith exposed item. Thus, 
successful cheating on a test is jointly determined by both examinees’ cheating status 
and the status of the items on the test. Under the DGIRTM definition, test takers only 
successfully cheat on a test when they want to cheat and items have been exposed.  
Generally, the DGIRTM has the model input I to specify item exposure status 
and four model parameters which will be estimated based on the response data (e.g., 
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item difficulty b, examinees’ true ability θt, examinees’ cheating ability θc and 
cheating status T). Cheating ability θc is the latent trait to characterize cheaters’ 
cheating level, which is essentially a combination of true ability and score gain, and 
the true ability θt, is the latent trait to characterize examinees’ real knowledge level or 
competence. The two latent trait abilities (cheating and true ability abilities) and one 
single item parameter (item difficulty) imply that cheaters’ cheating activities only 
change cheaters’ ability and have no impact on item characteristics. 
In the DGIRTM, the true ability parameter is scored mainly by the unexposed 
items and the cheating ability is scored mainly based on the exposed items. Given a 
certain examinee, if his/her two latent traits scored by the two different sets of items 
exhibit a noticeable difference (i.e., a score gain above scoring error), the gated 
variable T will trigger and assigns him/her into the cheating group. A higher score 
gain results in a higher likelihood to be treated as a cheater. In the model estimation 
section, the algorithm of how the model could assign the examinees with noticeable 
score as cheaters is presented.  
35B34BModel Estimation of the Deterministic, Gated IRT model 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC; Patz & Junker, 1999a, 1999b; Mislevy, 
Almond, Yan, D., & Steinberg,1999; Templin & Henson 2006; Templin, Henson, 
Templin, & Rousso, 2008; Henson, 2009. etc…), as a representative Bayesian 
estimation algorithm, is now gaining popularity in educational measurement field. As 
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Patz and Junker (1999a & 1999b) stated, MCMC is a sampling method to simulate 
posterior distributions for multivariate variables based on the prior information 
available-that is a Bayesian approach, so the features of posterior variables could be 
characterized based on the simulated posterior distributions.  In Bayesian estimation, 
a variety of prior distributions of the model parameters could be easily incorporated 
into estimation. Hierarchical Bayesian inference via MCMC sampling (i.e., a MCMC 
estimation procedure embedded with a hierarchical parameters) is widely used (e.g., 
in diagnostic classification models) due to its ability to deal with multi-dimensions as 
well as computer’s increasing computational power. As Fu pointed out (2005) that  
Unlike the Bayesian model estimation, where the parameter space is searched to 
find the modal point of the posterior distribution, Bayesian inference with 
MCMC draws a sufficient number of samples from the posterior distribution, 
and then makes inferences based on the distribution of these samples, such as 
the mean and variance of the distribution. (p.96).  
Considering the two dimensions of the model, a Hierarchical MCMC algorithm 
is adopted to estimate the DGIRTM. Specifically, the prior distribution of each 
parameter in the DGIRTM is defined as following:  
~ 0,1                                                                   (32) 
~ 0,1                                                                   (33) 
~ 0,1                                                                    (34) 
1,                                                            (35) 
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The true proficiency ( ), cheating ability ( ) and item difficulty (b) have 
independent standardized normal distribution as their priors, and the cheating status (T) 
is governed by the relationship between the prior of true proficiency ( ) and the prior 
of cheating ability ( ). When the prior of an examinee’s true proficiency is greater 
than the prior of his/her cheating ability, T will be assigned 0 as its prior, which 
implies he or she is proposed to be a non-cheater; otherwise, T will be assigned 1 as 
its prior, which means that she or he is proposed to be a cheater. The theoretical base 
of the MCMC is not the focus of this dissertation, but the detailed MCMC estimation 
algorithm for this DGIRTM in R statistic language is provided in the Appendix I of 
this dissertation. As a note, in the set of R code in the Appendix, the mean of cheating 
ability is hierarchically modeled, allowing for its change according to the samples, as 
opposed to a fixed mean zero in equation 33. The benefit of allowing a changing 
mean of the cheating ability is to solve, or at least reduce, the scale shift problem 
when cheating size is large (the scale shift problem will be discussed in the Chapter 
4).   
As implied in Equation 35, a cheaters’ cheating ability is always greater than 
their true ability as is defined in the prior distribution for T.  Thus, examinees have a 
higher probability of correctly answering items with beneficial knowledge from 
cheating than without cheating. From a practical standpoint, those cheaters who 
obtain positive score gain from their cheating activities are those who bias our 
inference of ability from test scores. The degree of such bias grows given an 
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increasing score gain. It should be noted that even though cheaters might have 
negative score gains due to the wrong information they obtained from their cheating 
activities, such cheaters with negative score gain will not be of interest because they 
have already punished themselves by their own cheating activities.  
The DGIRTM only provides an item difficulty to represent the item 
characteristics, which are constrained to be equal between the cheater and non-cheater 
for a given item. The DGIRTM estimated by the Hierarchical MCMC also provides 
three parameters to characterize each examinee. One is the examinees’ true 
proficiency ( ), which is a parameter representing examinee’s real knowledge level. 
The second examinee parameter is the examinees’ cheating ability ( ) which is a 
parameter to characterize the level of ability when that examinee cheats. Finally, the 
last parameter related to examinees is the gated variable T, which is essentially an 
indicator if the ability characterized by the exposed items (i.e., cheating ability) is 
significantly greater than the true ability mainly characterized by the unexposed items.  
Given an examine, the probability (represented by ) that his/her cheating 
ability is significantly greater than his/her true ability is the estimated mean of the 
posterior distribution of T (the posterior distribution of T is obtained via MCMC 
sampling procedure). Statistically, throughout the MCMC estimation algorithm,  
describes the proportion of proposals where Tj=1 among all the proposed Tj, which 
measures the posterior probability that the jth examinee’s cheating ability is greater 
than its true ability. Therefore,  could be explained as a p-value of a significance 
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test on the difference between the two latent traits scored by exposed and unexposed 
items for the jth examinee. The directionality of the magnitude of  positively links 
to difference between the cheating ability and true ability (i.e., a greater difference 
leads to a greater level of ). Therefore,  could be directly explained as the 
probability that examinees’ cheating ability is significantly greater than their true 
ability. Most importantly,  does not define the probability that examinee is a cheater, 
but instead defines the probability that the cheating ability is higher than the true 
ability. However, conditional on the item exposure status in the DGIRTM where 
cheating is the reasonable explanation of a significant difference between the cheating 
ability and true ability,  could indirectly serve as an indicator that examinees cheat 
or not.   
Examinees could be classified as cheaters or non-cheaters by setting a cut point 
Pc (Pc  0,1 ) for , as shown in equation 36,  
1, T p
0, T p  
                                                       (36) 
If the  is greater than Pc, then examinees should be classified as cheaters 
(Tj=1); if the  is less than the Pc, examinees should be classified as non-cheaters 
(Tj=0). Specifically, a greater  results in a higher chance to be classified as a test 
cheater under the DGIRTM. The selection of cutting point Pc is a critical factor to 
impact the False Positive and False Negative rate of the classification. When Pc 
increases, it will correspondingly decrease the False Positive rate of classification, 
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since less non-cheaters are mis-classified as cheaters; when Pc decreases, it will 
accordingly increases the False Positive rate because more non-cheaters will be 
mis-classified as cheaters.  
In MCMC, the posterior distribution of cheating status T, as determined by 
Bayesian Theorem, is jointly determined by its prior and the cheating information 
carried by the real response data. In terms of the prior of T, the prior probability for 
each examinee being a cheater is 0.5 (i.e., the probability of T=1), which is 
determined by the relationship between the prior of the true proficiency and the prior 
of cheating ability. Specifically, the prior of T is equal to the prior probability that true 
ability is greater than the cheating ability. Because the prior for true ability and 
cheating ability is defined such that they are independent normal distributions with 
mean zero and variance equal to unity, this prior probability of T=1 is 0.5.   
The amount of cheating information is determined by cheaters’ score gain. As 
stated above, the score difference of interest is essentially the difference between 
examinee’s ability scored by the unexposed items and that scored by the exposed 
items. As implied by the DGIRTM, ability by the exposed items is assumed to be 
always greater than the ability scored by the unexposed items for cheaters and 
otherwise there would be no difference. Such score gain that goes above the scoring 
error level would result in a high value of . When the cheating ability is greater than 
the true ability, there is enough information for the DGIRT model via MCMC to 
“accept” the assumption that the cheating ability is greater than the true ability, but 
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when the score gain is small (i.e., below the standard error of the model estimation), 
not enough information is available for the DGIRTM via MCMC to “accept” that the 
cheating ability is greater than the true ability. 
With respect to non-cheaters, no score difference theoretically exists between the 
exposed and unexposed items, because non-cheaters use their true ability to answer 
both (i.e., no cheating information is available in real data and thus the priors will 
determine the posterior distribution). As a result, the marginal posterior distribution of 
a non-cheater’s true ability should be identical to the marginal posterior distribution of 
the cheating ability. In addition, there should be no association between the cheating 
ability and the true ability given an examinee, as determined by the fact that the 
cheating and true ability are independently proposed by two standardized normal 
distribution. Thus, the probability of the cheating ability being higher than the true 
ability for the posterior distribution of a non-cheater will equal 0.5, theoretically.  
That is, a 0.50 is an indication that an examinee is not a cheater (as opposed to 
0.00 .  
With respect to test cheaters, a score difference theoretically exists because 
cheaters use their real competence to answer unexposed items and use their cheating 
ability to respond to exposed items. Such score difference or score gain by cheaters 
increases along with their increasing cheating effectiveness. Cheating effectiveness is 
used to describe how effective cheaters’ cheating activities are, which represents the 
cheating information embedded in the real response data. Effective cheaters will have 
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noticeable score gain and thus the posterior mean for the cheating ability is expected 
to be higher than the posterior mean of the true ability. As a result, the probability of 
the cheating ability being greater than the true ability will be higher than 0.5 (which is 
the assumed probability of the prior distribution). Notice that an un-effective cheater 
is expected to perform in a similar way as a non-cheater and, thus, cannot be 
distinguished from a non-cheater (i.e., the model treats an un-effective cheater as a 
non-cheater). Therefore, a 0.50 is also an indication that an examinee is a 
un-effective cheater who acts similarly as non-cheater, and in contrast, a  close to 
one indicates that the jth examinee is a highly likely test cheaters. The closer to one, 
the higher certainty that the cheating ability is greater than the true ability with a 
noticeable difference, which implies a high probability of being a cheater.  
Because non-cheaters or un-effective cheaters’ ability scored by the unexposed 
items would be exactly equal to their ability scored by the exposed items,  of 
non-cheaters/un-effective cheaters should be equal 0.5. As a result, if 0.5 is set as ’s 
cut point, around one half of non-cheaters would be incorrectly classified as cheaters. 
In other words, we only have a 50 percent confidence level to classify the jth examinee 
as a test cheater. However, a basic requirement of test cheating detection model is to 
sensitively identify cheaters with a small degree of error, because of our testing 
evaluation purpose to allocate right talents into right learning or working positions 
and to treat innocent test takers with fairness. Testing agencies might also expose 
themselves to potential law suit charges when an innocent test taker is classified as 
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test cheaters. Thus, as an introduction to the DGIRTM in this dissertation, the cut 
point for  is set as 0.9, as opposed to 0.5 which might be used in a traditional two 
class model, which implies the jth examinee is classified as a test cheater or 
non-cheater with a 90 percent of confidence level. As a note, practitioners could also 
choose 0.95 as the cut point for , which implies a 95 percent confidence level.  
Hierarchical MCMC, as the model estimation algorithm, offers flexibility to 
incorporate a variety of priors and conduct a large number of dimensions of 
estimation while allowing for the conceptual expectations on the DGIRTM. The 
features of the DGIRTM are conceptually discussed and compared with the reviewed 
cheating detection methods in next section. 
18B17BFeatures of the Deterministic, Gated IRT model 
Generally, the DGIRTM is a Rash based mixture model. It incorporates two 
categories of latent abilities to separately characterize examinees’ real knowledge 
level and cheaters’ cheating degree. The model input related to item status classifies 
test items as exposed and unexposed items, and therefore an examinee is expected to 
perform better on the exposed items than on the unexposed item, if he or she is 
cheating. The cheating status parameter is a direct index to represent the level of the 
score difference between exposed and unexposed items, and thus indirectly serves as 




    Under the DGIRTM framework, the item difficulty is fixed on a single scale for 
both cheaters and non-cheaters (i.e., the item difficulty is equivalent for cheating and 
non-cheating cases). It is assumed that the cheating scale determined by the exposed 
and unexposed items are the same, and the difference is that through examinees who 
cheat on test appear to have a higher ability along with the fixed scale. Conceptually, 
we believe that the ability of examinees improves and the item characteristics do not 
change in cheating context. 
The model input is dichotomously defined to represent exposed and unexposed 
items, which helps to define inner person comparisons conditional on the two groups 
of items (exposed or unexposed items). As already stated, a cheaters’ cheating ability 
is defined by their response to exposed items and their true ability is estimated by 
their response to unexposed items. A noticeable difference between the two categories 
of abilities (true ability and cheating ability) is detected as an evidence of test cheating. 
One direct cause of a statistical difference between the true and cheating ability is that 
examinees have the opportunity to cheat on exposed items and no opportunity to cheat 
on unexposed items.  
Essentially, the cheating probability is estimated by the model to represent the 
severity of the score gain. Statistically, it could be explained as a p-value of a 
significance test. A significant value of the cheating probability represents a notable 
score gain which is above the random error of examinee scoring. In real settings, it is 
the group of effective cheaters (e.g., who cheat and obtain a significant score gain) 
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who severely damage the test validity. The DGIRTM is designed to identify such kind 
of effective cheaters. In addition, notice that because this “test” for cheating is within 
a person, it is not necessary to have a large proportion of cheaters in the sample to 
allow for the identification of a cheating group. 
As compared to cheating detection indices, this model also measures the level of 
cheaters’ real competence and the severity of their cheating activities. Unlike some 
copying indices and person fit indices where cheaters’ true ability is confounded with 
their cheating information, the DGIRTM distinguishes cheaters’ real competence from 
their cheating skill.  As a result, estimation and identification of cheaters is not 
dramatically affected by the proportion of cheaters relative to non-cheaters, like other 
indices (e.g., lz index). In addition, this model could incorporate outside information 
related to item status. Specifically, the parameter Ii could be defined as a continuous 
variable with a value interval [0,1] rather than a dichotomous input. When the model 
input (I) is used to represent the item status relative to exposure status, the DGIRTM 
is particularly useful to detect test cheating caused by item exposure, as discussed in 
this dissertation. If the model input is defined as items status relative to different item 
points of its administration, the DGIRTM is able to monitor examinees’ growth over 
time.   
The DGIRTM is designed to detect effective cheaters by distinguishing cheaters’ 
real knowledge level from their cheating skills. Its features conceptually make the 
DGIRTM a promising tool to identify test cheating due to item over-exposure.  
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19B18BThe Simulation Design 
In this section, a simulation study is designed to illustrate the characteristics of 
the Deterministic, Gated IRT model and its power to detect test cheating. Three 
categories of conditions are considered in this simulation design. The conditions about 
item characteristics are first introduced, which is followed by a description of the 
simulation of examinees’ ability. Next the conditions about cheating characteristics are 
presented. At the end of this chapter, a data generation model (a model used to 
generate response data) is introduced and an example process is described to 
demonstrate how the response data is generated. As a practical note, the number of 
examinees is set as 2000 in every condition, and the chain length of each MCMC 
chain is 5000 where the first 3000 steps serve as the burning period. Although in 
actual applications of this model the chain must be much longer, because the true 
model is known this chain length and burn-in is sufficient to achieve convergence and 
reliable estimates. 
36B35BSimulated Item Characteristics 
Three variables describing item characteristics are considered, which are item 
number, item difficulty location and standard deviation. Test length is a key factor 
determining test reliability. Although the DGIRTM is designed to detect test cheating 
at the examinee level, the information provided by items plays a critical role on the 
accuracy of cheating detection. In this study, two levels of test length are considered: 
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(1) a short test with 40 items; and (2) a long test with 80 items.  
Other than test length, item difficulty, or location, is a key factor impacting the 
test information location, while the standard deviation of item difficulty is a key factor 
determining the magnitude of test information. Test information location refers to the 
point along the ability distribution where a test has the greatest amount of information. 
Amount of test information refers to the magnitude of information at a certain 
difficulty point. Two conditions of item difficulty location are simulated to control 
this information location. One condition is that the mean item difficulty for the 
exposed items is equal to the average of the cheaters’ cheating ability, and the mean 
item difficulty of unexposed items is equal to the average of the true ability of all the 
test takers. A second condition is that the mean of item difficulty is set as zero. In 
terms of the standard deviation of item difficulty, in one condition the standard 
deviation is set as 0.5, which represents a high degree of information at the difficulty 
location, and in the other condition the item standard deviation is set as one, 
representing a normal degree of amount of information.  
Such design is practically meaningful for the computerized adaptive tests (CATs) 
and normal CBT. In CATs, items are typically selected based strictly on examines 
estimated ability level. Those items in a CAT test normally have a mean at the mean 
of the examinees’ estimated ability with a relatively small standard deviation. Thus, 
the performance of the DGIRTM under the settings which are similar to CAT 
applications is computed, especially given the fact that the DGIRTM is designed to 
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detect test cheating caused by item over-exposure. In contrast, items are usually 
distributed with a mean zero and a unit standard deviation in normal CBT testing 
settings.  
The DGIRTM model separates items in a test into two categories: exposed items 
which can be cheated by examinees and unexposed items which cannot be cheated by 
examinees. The number of exposed items and unexposed items should inevitably 
impact the accuracy of cheating detection. In terms of the number of exposed items 
and unexposed items, three designs are considered in this simulation: a balanced 
design where the number of exposed items is equal to that of exposed items, an 
over-exposed design where the number of exposed items is greater than that of 
unexposed items, and a under-exposed design where the number of exposed items is 
less than that of unexposed items. Specially, 50 percent of items were exposed in the 
balanced items, 70 percent of items were exposed in the over-exposed design and 30 
percent of items were exposed in the under-exposed design. As a summary, all the 
conditions related with item characteristics considered in this simulation are listed in 
the Table 1. 
Table 1. Item Conditions 
Conditions Value  
Test length  C(40, 80) 
Proportion of exposed items in a test C(0.3, 0.5, 0.7) 
Item difficulty location bu=Mt, be=Mc or b=Md
Standard deviation of item difficulty 0.5 and 1 
bu =the mean of unexposed item difficulty, be =the mean of exposed item difficulty, b= the mean of 
all-item difficulty,Mt= the mean of all examinees’ true ability, Mc= the mean of the cheaters’ cheating 
ability, Md= the mean of the difference between the true ability and cheating ability. 
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37B36BSimulated Cheating Characteristics 
Cheating characteristics, including Cheating size, Cheating degree and Cheating 
effectiveness, are also considered in this simulation design. Cheating size is used to 
refer to how many examinees in a test are involved in cheating activities. Cheating 
degree represents how many cheaters cheated on specific exposed items. Cheating 
effectiveness is used to describe how effective cheating activities are (i.e., how much 
score gain cheaters obtain from their cheating activities). These three factors together 
determine the amount of test cheating information embedded in response data. 
Different tests could have different rates of cheating. For example, a test with 
items which have been exposed for a long period of time may be cheated on by a 
large number of test takers, but a test with recently exposed items may have lower 
rates of cheating. Three levels of cheating size are considered: a low level cheating (5 
percent of test takers cheating in a test), medium level cheating (35 percent of test 
takers cheating in a test), and high level cheating (70 percent of test takers cheating in 
a test). The 70 percent cheating size is simulated to represent the organized concert 
cheating (i.e., group cheating), which has been known to occur in reality. For instance, 
some test takers share items they remembered by internet (called internet 
collaboration), or some individuals purposely memorize items and sell them to test 
takers afterwards.  
In addition to Cheating size, each exposed item has been cheated on by a 
different number of cheaters. Essentially, each exposed item has a different cheating 
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degree. Two levels in terms of cheating degree are considered. In the low cheating 
degree condition 50 to 80 percent of cheaters cheat on a given exposed item. In the 
high cheating degree condition 80 to 100 percent of cheaters cheat on an exposed 
item. 
Cheating effectiveness is the last factor we considered in terms of cheating 
characteristics. As stated above, some cheaters are less likely to correctly respond on 
all the cheated items. Therefore, even though cheating can improve the overall 
observed performance, it may be to different degrees because of many real factors 
(e.g., their true ability, the degree of correctness of source information) besides the 
fact that cheaters conduct cheating activities.  Cheaters, therefore, are not necessarily 
equally effective. Specifically, some cheaters might be effective enough to correctly 
answer all cheated items that should originally be incorrectly answered according to 
their true ability. Some cheaters might still incorrectly answer some of the exposed 
items although they cheat on the exposed items. Thus, cheaters in this study are 
classified as high-effective cheaters, medium-effective cheaters and low-effective 
cheaters.  
The high-effective cheaters have the largest score gain from their cheating 
activities, low-effective cheaters have the smallest score gain from their cheating 
activities, and medium-effective cheaters’ score gain is between that of the 
high-effective cheaters and that of the low-effective cheaters. To be detailed, the delta 
of the high-effective cheaters is simulated by Beta (9, 4)*3 (called Delta1), the delta 
of medium-effective cheaters is simulated by Beta (5, 5)*3 (called Deta2 ) and that of 
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low-effective cheaters is simulated by Beta(1.5, 5)*3 (called Delta3). The 
distributions for the simulated cheating gain scores, Delta1, Delta2, and Delta3, are 
shown in Figure 1 to Figure 3. The empirical statistic characteristics of Delta1, Delta2, 
and Delta3 are provided in Table 2.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Delta Distribution of High-Effective Cheaters 
 
 
Figure 2. The Delta Distribution of Medium-Effective Cheaters 





































Figure 3. The Delta Distribution of Low-Effective Cheaters 
Table 2. The Characteristics of Delta1, Delta2, and Delta3 
Delta Delta1=Beta(9,4)*3 Delta1=Beta(5,5)*3 Delta1=Beta(1.5,5)*3 
Mean 2.078 1.500 0.692 
SD 0.369 0.453 0.462 
Min 0.443 0.088 0 
Max 2.965 2.928 2.738 
As a further illustration, Delta 1 is negatively skewed, Delta 2 is normally 
distributed and Delta 3 is positively skewed. In Delta 1, most of cheaters tend to be 
effective cheaters, but some of them are not as effective as others, in Delta 3, most of 
the cheaters are non-effective, but a small proportion of cheaters might be effective. 
Based on the cheating characteristics, the two latent traits are described in next 
section.  
38B37BThe Simulation Design about the True and Cheating Ability 
Cheating ability is considered as a combination of true ability and score gain in 
this simulation. True ability ( ) was simulated by the standardized normal 
distribution. The Delta (also called score gain) refers to the amount of ability 


















difference between the true ability and cheating ability. As a note, the Delta is always 
greater than zero, because logically we believe that cheaters will have a positive score 
gain due to beneficial information cheaters obtain from their cheating activities.   
θ ~ 0,1                                                                   (37) 
θ θ  ∆                                                                 (38) 
∆~Beta α, β A B                                                         (39) 
where the parameters A and B in equation (39) are scaling factors to change the lower 
and upper limits of the Beta distribution (this distribution is also commonly referred 
to as a four-parameter Beta distribution). Specifically, A is set as 3 and B is set as 0 in 
this simulation design.  
Empirically, examinees who are competent normally tend to rely on their own 
knowledge and competence to respond to items. However, those examinees who are 
not competent enough would be more likely to seek for cheating to help them respond 
to items, and thus they could obtain a greater test score. From the practical standpoint, 
test cheaters who are competent are less likely to obtain a noticeable score gain, 
because there is not much room for them to improve their scores. In contrast, cheaters 
who are less competent might be more likely to obtain a noticeable score gain than 
cheaters who are actually competent. In other words, test cheaters who are less 
competent might have a greater degree of invalidating the inference made based on 
tests. Therefore, in this simulation design, 60 percent of cheaters are sampled from the 
low ability students whose true ability is less than -0.5, 30 percent of cheaters are 
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randomly sampled from the medium ability students whose true ability is between 
-0.5 and 0.5, and 10 percent of cheaters are randomly selected from the high ability 
students whose true ability is greater than 0.5. The composition of test cheating 
population is represented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Cheaters’ Distribution 
Conditions Cheating size=5% Cheating size=20% Cheating size=70% 
True ability< -0.5 60% 5% 2000 60% 35% 2000 60% 70% 2000 
True ability=U(-0.5, 0.5) 30% 5% 2000 30% 35% 2000 30% 70% 2000 
True ability> 0.5 10% 5% 2000 10% 35% 2000 10% 70% 2000 
 
As an illustration, when the cheating size is 5 percent (the first column in Table 
4), and thus total number of cheaters in this case is 2000*5%=100. 60 (60%*100) out 
of the 100 cheaters are low ability students whose true abilities are below -0.5, 30 
(30%*100) out of the 100 cheaters are the students whose true abilities are between 
-0.5 and 0.5, and 10 (10%*100) out of the 100 cheaters are capable students whose 
abilities are greater than 0.5. Together with the cheating effectiveness, the different 
categories of test cheaters are listed in Table 4.  
Table 4. Joint Conditions of Ability Distribution 
Conditions Delta1 Delta2 Delta3 
True ability< -0.5 Yes Yes Yes 
True ability[-0.5,0.5] Yes Yes Yes 










As shown in Table 4, the two conditions (i.e., the composition of examinees’ real 
proficiency and cheating effectiveness) are fully crossed to create three categories of 
test cheaters: high-effective, medium-effective and low-effective cheaters. All the 
conditions considered in this simulation design are listed in Table 5 as an overall 
summary. 
Table 5. Joint Conditions 
Conditions  Number of conditions 
Test length 2 
Proportion of exposed items  3 
Item Difficulty location  2 
Standard deviation of item difficulty 2 
The cheating degree on exposed items 2 
Cheating size  3 
Cheating category  3 
Guessing level 1 
 
A total number of joint conditions considered in this research is 432 (2 3 2
2 2 3 3). A small number of replications is a common practice when using MCMC 
as the estimation algorithm, so each joint condition is replicated for 10 times in the 
simulation. 
39B38BData Generation Process 
Considering the complexity of data generation, a more general model called data 
generation model is used to generate the response data, which is defined as:  
1 1 1  1                     (40) 
where S=T*I. T is the dichotomous cheating parameters for each examinee, which is a 
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vector N 1; I is the model input relative item exposure status, which is a vector 1 J. 
Thus S is a matrix with N J, which is a joint parameter used to define the probability 
that a specific examinee cheats on a given item. N is the number of examinees and J is 
the number of items. 
As an important note, I is not as a dichotomous parameters any more as it is in 
the Deterministic, Gated IRT model. In the data generation model, Ii is defined as:  
0,         unexposed items
 U l , l , exposed items                                            (41) 
Where, Ii will be set as 0 if the ith item is unexposed items, otherwise Ii will be 
uniformly sampled from U [ll, lu] (ll is the lower limit and lu is upper limit of the 
uniform distribution). As defined above, U [ll, lu] has two levels: U(0.5, 0.8) and 
U(0.8, 1). Ii=0 for those unexposed items, which implies that examinees have no 
chance to cheat on ith item. Ii= U [ll, lu] for those exposed items, which implies that 
each exposed items could be randomly cheated by different cheaters with different 
cheating degree.  
Cheaters are randomly sampled from the specific true ability domain (defined in 
Table 4) by controlling the total number of cheating. As an illustration, the case that 
cheaters are high-effective cheaters is used as an example to present the sampling 
process. 
1) Identifying target domain (D). In terms of the true ability, the target domain 
consists of three sub-domains, where D=C(D1,D2,D3). D1=C( < -0.5), 
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D2=C(-0.5< < 0.5), and D3= C( > 0.5). The cheating ability equals to the sum 
of true ability and delta1, which is 1. 
2) Determining sample size from each sub-domain. For example, if the 20percent of 
examinees cheat in the test, the total number of cheaters is 20%*2000=400. Then 
cheaters in the sub-domain D1 is 400*60%=240, the cheaters from sub-domain D2 
is 400*30%=120, and the cheaters from sub-domain D3 is 400*10%=40.  
3) Sampling cheaters from sub-domains with the correct cheating size. The T of each 
cheater is assigned a value 1, or it will be assigned a value 0.  
In order to make sure each sub-domain has enough samples, a population with 
100,000 samples is simulated. Then cheaters and non-cheaters are sampled from this 
big population by following all the simulation specification. All the conditions related 
to items, two categories of abilities, cheating characteristics and cheating population 
are jointly integrated together in the simulation process.  
40B39BComparison Baseline 
The lz index and a simple t-test is used as the baseline for comparison to 
demonstrate the model’s improvement in capability to detect test cheating. The lz 
index, like the DGIRTM, is used to detect test cheating at the examinee level. As 
stated before, previous research (Reise & Due, 1991, Drasgow & Levine, 1986) 
shows that the lz index is among the best indices to detect misfit response pattern 
caused by test cheating.  
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As opposed to use the existing lz index as comparison-baseline, a simple t-test is 
designed which originally comes from the model itself. The model separates the items 
into two sets (exposed and unexposed items). The DGIRTM could be essentially 
described as a model to identify the examinees with significant score difference 
between the two sets of items. Similarly, the t-test is designed based on the two sets of 
items without a complex model equation and estimation algorithm. In the t-test, each 
examinee is separately scored using an IRT model by his/her exposed items and 
unexposed items, thus each examinee has a pair of ability or theta scores (i.e., the 
latent score for each examinee), one theta score is obtained on the basis of the 
exposed items and the other theta score is on the basis of the unexposed items. Then a 
t-test on the score difference between the pair of theta scores is conducted for each 
examinee. The t-test is essentially a non-central t for two estimates of ability, where a 
pooled standard error of estimate is used in the denominator.  That is,  
                                                      (42) 
where the numerator of the t-test is the observed score difference for estimates of 
θ respectively computed using the exposed items and unexposed items. As noted 
above, the pooled standard error of estimate is used as the denominator of the t-test.  
The null hypothesis is that the difference is only observed by random error in 
estimation and should be normally distributed with a mean zero and a unit standard 
deviation. The null hypothesis is that the difference by chance, should be normally 
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distributed with a mean zero and a unit standard deviation. A significant value of the 
t-test (i.e, the observed statistic value of the t-test for an examinee is greater than the 
preset critical value, 0.05) might imply an alterative: an unusual score difference 
between exposed and unexposed items exists which should not be due to chance.   
By comparing to the t-test, the model’s advanced ability in separating cheaters from 
innocent test takers can be fully exhibited.  
Two indices (i.e., sensitivity and specificity) are used to evaluate the accuracy 
and reliability of DGIRTM as well as the lz index and the t-test. Sensitivity is the 
proportion of true cheaters who are correctly detected as cheaters by this model, and 
Specificity refers to the proportion of real innocent test takers who are correctly 
classified as non-cheaters by this model. The sensitivity is an index to measure the 
model’s power to detect test cheaters, while the specificity is an index to represent the 
degree of misclassifying non-cheaters as test cheaters. Given a greater sensitivity, the 
power to detect test cheaters grows. In contrast, a greater specificity implies a smaller 
degree of error. In one word, a good test cheating detection model should acquire an 
ability to maintain a high level of both sensitivity and specificity. In this way, the 
cheating detection method can efficiently identify test cheaters and yet derive a small 




9B9BRESULT AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the results of the simulation study are summarized to illustrate the 
accuracy and reliability of the model under a variety of conditions (e.g. cheating 
effectiveness, test length, information location, etc….). The DGIRTM’s specificity is 
first presented followed by a detailed discussion on the DGIRTM’s sensitivity in 
every joint condition. Next, the accuracy of the model estimation is described by 
using root mean square error and correlation between the estimation of the DGIRTM 
and the true value. Finally, as a comparison baseline, the lz index and a simple t-test 
(which will be fully presented in the following section) are incorporated in this 
dissertation to demonstrate the model’s improvement in capability to detect test 
cheating.  
20B19BModel’s Specificity 
Given that every examinee should be treated with fairness, to correctly identify 
the innocent test takers is as important as to sensitively detect test cheaters. The 
DGIRTM seems to be powerful for correctly identifying innocent test takers based on 




Table 6. The Sensitivity and Specificity of the Informative Test with 50% Exposed Items 
Conditions High Effective Medium Effective Low effective 
Degree Length Cheat Size Sensitivity Specificity Sensitivity Specificity Sensitivity Specificity 
0.8-1 
Short 
70% 45.60% 98.90% 34.20% 99.10% 18.10% 99.30% 
35% 76.60% 96.20% 56.40% 97.40% 25.90% 98.00% 
5% 84.80% 95.00% 66.40% 96.30% 28.70% 96.80% 
Long 
70% 82.00% 97.70% 62.00% 98.60% 28.30% 98.90% 
35% 92.50% 95.80% 79.40% 96.70% 38.50% 97.60% 
5% 94.50% 94.70% 83.80% 95.40% 45.00% 96.50% 
0.5-0.8 
Short 
70% 32.97% 98.77% 24.93% 98.98% 12.82% 99.20% 
35% 62.54% 96.99% 42.16% 97.65% 17.97% 97.98% 
5% 72.10% 94.97% 53.00% 96.78% 20.70% 96.84% 
Long 
70% 65.97% 97.78% 45.16% 98.67% 19.21% 99.03% 
35% 85.77% 96.02% 66.06% 96.89% 27.37% 97.95% 
5% 89.30% 94.49% 72.00% 95.54% 33.90% 96.50% 
Degree= cheating degree; Length=Test length; short= test with 40 items; long= test with 80 items; High Effective=high effective cheaters; Medium 
Effective=medium effective cheaters; Low Effective=low effective cheaters. 70%=70% examinees cheat in the simulated test; 35%=35% examinees cheat in the 
simulated test; 5%=5% examinees cheat in the simulated test; 0.8-1=each exposed items are cheated by 80%-100% test cheaters; 0.5-0.8=each exposed items are 




Table 7. The Sensitivity and Specificity of the Normal Test with 50% Exposed Items 
Conditions High Effective Medium Effective Low effective 
Degree Length Cheat Size Sensitivity Specificity Sensitivity Specificity Sensitivity Specificity 
0.8-1 
Short 
70% 37.26% 99.95% 27.19% 99.67% 15.22% 99.10% 
35% 69.56% 99.05% 50.46% 98.49% 23.41% 97.73% 
5% 80.60% 97.99% 61.50% 97.16% 27.10% 96.36% 
Long 
70% 78.38% 99.62% 56.02% 99.20% 24.82% 99.00% 
35% 91.87% 98.53% 75.63% 97.83% 35.77% 97.50% 
5% 94.90% 97.06% 81.80% 96.58% 43.40% 96.15% 
0.5-0.8 
Short 
70% 24.14% 99.95% 18.34% 99.53% 10.32% 98.83% 
35% 49.49% 98.85% 33.10% 98.72% 16.16% 97.58% 
5% 60.10% 97.72% 42.30% 97.51% 19.70% 96.55% 
Long 
70% 55.36% 99.58% 35.94% 99.33% 17.07% 98.73% 
35% 79.07% 98.25% 57.37% 97.98% 25.39% 97.68% 
5% 84.60% 97.15% 68.00% 96.36% 31.40% 96.21% 
Degree= cheating degree; Length=Test length; short= test with 40 items; long= test with 80 items; High Effective=high effective cheaters; Medium 
Effective=medium effective cheaters; Low Effective=low effective cheaters. 70%=70% examinees cheat in the simulated test; 35%=35% examinees cheat in the 
simulated test; 5%=5% examinees cheat in the simulated test; 0.8-1=each exposed items are cheated by 80%-100% test cheaters; 0.5-0.8=each exposed items are 




As an illustration, the detailed specificity as well as sensitivity of the DGIRTM 
across test length, cheating degree, cheating effectiveness, and cheating size is 
presented in Table 6 and Table 7. 
The specificity in Table 6 and Table 7 is stably distributed around 96 percent, 
which implies that almost all the innocent test takers (or non-cheaters) are correctly 
identified. Specifically, the minimum specificity in these two tables is 94.49 percent 
(located in the column 2 and last row in Table 6) and the maximum specificity is 
almost 100percent. Each of the conditions considered in this simulation study has no 
or only slight impacts on the model’s specificity.  
As a further demonstration, the specificity within different levels of cheating 
effectiveness (high, medium and low effectiveness) is box-plotted in Figure 4 to 
exhibit the DGIRTM’s stable specificity in all the conditions. As shown in Figure 4, 
the specificity in all different cases is greater than 90 percent with fairly small 
variance. Especially, when 70 percent of test takers are test cheaters, the model’s 
specificity is almost 1, which means the model makes no mistake in detecting 
non-cheaters. The factors, including test length, test information, proportion of 
exposed items, cheating size and cheating effectiveness, only slightly impact the 
model’s specificity. One of the valuable characteristics of the DGIRTM is its 
capability to maintain a high level of specificity across different conditions, which 




   
 
 
Figure 4. The Specificity across Different Conditions. “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; 
“cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are 
exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed; “High Effective”= high effective 
cheaters; “Medium Effective”= medium effective cheaters; “Low Effective”= low effective cheaters.



























































































































Compared to the specificity which is consistently stable across different 
conditions, the sensitivity of this model is greatly impacted by cheating effectiveness, 
cheating size, cheating degree, information and test length. Generally, the test length, 
cheating effectiveness, cheating degree and test information increase the model’s 
sensitivity, but the cheating size decreases the model’s sensitivity.  
41B40BThe Impact of Cheating Effectiveness 
As stated before, the model is designed to detect effective cheaters who have 
noticeable score gain and might treat the low effective cheaters who have no or little 
score gain as innocent test takers. As a result, the sensitivity of the model to detect test 
cheaters should increase along with cheaters’ cheating effectiveness (score gain). The 
results in Table 6 and Table 7 show that the model is able to detect effective cheaters 
but loses its power at low-effective cheaters. For example, the sensitivity of the model 
is 94.9 percent when the cheaters effectively cheat in a normal test with 80 items and 
cheating degree within 0.8 to 1, but it sharply drops to 43.4 percent when the cheaters 
low-effectively cheat on the exposed items. In other words, 94.9 percent of the high 
effective cheaters are correctly identified, but only 43.4 percent of the low effective 




levels of cheating effectiveness for the informative test is presented in Figure 5 and 
for more straightforward illustration is presented in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 5. The sensitivity of the Informative Test. “lh0.70”= the long test, 0.8-1 cheating degree and 
70% cheating size; “sh0.35”=the short test, 0.8-1 cheating degree and 35% cheating size; “ll0.70”= the 
long test, 0.5-0.8 cheating degree and 70% cheating size; “sl0.35”=the short test, 0.5-0.8 cheating degree 
and 35% cheating size.  
 
Figure 6. The sensitivity of the Normal Test. “lh0.70”= the long test, 0.8-1 cheating degree and 70% 
cheating size; “sh0.35”=the short test, 0.8-1 cheating degree and 35% cheating size; “ll0.70”= the long 
test, 0.5-0.8 cheating degree and 70% cheating size; “sl0.35”=the short test, 0.5-0.8 cheating degree 
and 35% cheating size. 
 
 








































In both Figure 5 and Figure 6, the solid line (represents the sensitivity in the high 
effective cheaters cases) is the highest, and the dotted line (represents the sensitivity 
in the low effective cheaters cases) is the lowest and the dash line (represents the 
sensitivity in the medium effective cheaters cases) is located at the middle. Based on 
the position of the three lines in Figure 5and Figure 6, high effective cheaters are 
mostly likely to be detected, medium effective cheaters are less likely to be identified 
and the low-effective cheaters are least likely to be detected.  
Other than the stable specificity of the DGIRTM, another valuable characteristic 
of this model is that test cheaters are more likely identified by the model when their 
cheating activities become increasingly effective. In real settings, those effective 
cheaters obtains significant score gain, and such score gain will lead us to make 
wrong inference on the cheaters. Effective cheaters severely invalidate the inferences 
made based on tests. Actually, the degree of invalidation would be increasingly worse 
when cheating effectiveness goes up. To detect such kind of cheaters, therefore, is 
practically meaningful and important for stakeholders. Together with the model’s 
stability and accuracy in specificity, the model is capable of detecting effective 
cheaters and makes a small degree of mistakes in cheating detection. 
42B41BImpact of Test Length and Number of Exposed Items 
Test length is a critical factor impacting this model’s sensitivity. In this 
simulation study, two conditions about test length are considered: a short test with 40 
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items and a long test with 80 items. The average sensitivity within the short test and 
long test along different cheating size is presented in Table 8, and the detailed 
sensitivity in each condition within short/long test is plotted in Figure 4 and Figure 5. 
As shown in Table 8, the average sensitivity within long test cases (represented 
by the second, fourth and sixth row in Table 8 ) is uniformly greater than the 
sensitivity in the corresponding conditions within short test cases( represented by the 
first, third and fifth row in the Table 8). Based on the results, the model is more 
sensitive to detect test cheaters in tests with a larger total number of items than those 
with a smaller total number of items.  
 
83




5% 35% 70% 
cs1p1 cs1p2 cs1p3 cs2p1 cs2p2 cs2p3 cs3p1 cs3p2 cs3p3 
High 
Effective 
S-Test 69.53% 74.31% 71.25% 56.28% 63.98% 58.34% 33.96% 34.54% 25.34%
L-Test 88.64% 90.61% 87.69% 84.52% 87.04% 82.56% 65.37% 69.87% 61.18%
Medium 
Effective 
S-Test 55.19% 55.34% 46.70% 41.94% 45.03% 38.28% 26.04% 25.84% 20.36%
L-Test 73.98% 76.08% 71.05% 65.45% 69.42% 61.35% 45.95% 49.18% 42.11%
Low 
Effective 
S-Test 28.03% 24.09% 18.98% 22.19% 20.80% 14.04% 15.06% 14.14% 9.88% 
L-Test 40.43% 38.98% 33.96% 32.07% 31.67% 26.40% 22.45% 22.17% 18.45%
cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are 
exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed.”S-Test”= short test with 40 items; “L-Test”=long test with 80 items. 
 
Table 9. The Sensitivity by Test Information and Cheating Degree in High Effective Cheating 
Length Cheating degree cs1p1 cs1p2 cs1p3 cs2p1 cs2p2 cs2p3 cs3p1 cs3p2 cs3p3 
Short Test
High cheating degree
81.30% 84.80% 81.20% 67.29% 76.63% 71.80% 41.56% 45.62% 36.80%
74.00% 80.60% 77.30% 60.69% 69.56% 65.13% 36.65% 37.26% 25.33%
Low cheating degree
66.60% 72.10% 71.80% 53.64% 62.54% 57.19% 31.37% 32.97% 25.69%
57.30% 60.10% 53.60% 45.46% 49.49% 40.37% 26.13% 24.14% 14.76%
Long Test
High cheating degree
94.30% 94.50% 92.40% 91.46% 92.47% 90.27% 76.96% 82.01% 76.05%
92.20% 94.90% 91.80% 89.87% 91.87% 88.51% 73.29% 78.38% 70.54%
Low cheating degree
88.20% 89.30% 86.30% 82.81% 85.77% 80.89% 60.18% 65.97% 58.99%
80.90% 84.60% 81.60% 74.83% 79.07% 70.50% 51.14% 55.36% 38.19%
“cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are exposed; 





Figure 7. The Sensitivity of Short Test. “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size 
with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are exposed; “p2”=50% 
items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
 












































Figure 8. The Sensitivity of Long Test. “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size 
with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are exposed; “p2”=50% 
items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
Like Table 8, Figure 7 and Figure 8 also show that the DGIRTM is more 
sensitive in the long test cases than it is in the short test cases. The DGIRTM classifies 
items as two types (exposed and unexposed items). An increase in the total number of 











































items means an increase in the number of both exposed and unexposed items. The 
model becomes more sensitive to detect test cheaters when there is an increase in the 
number of both exposed items and unexposed items.  
Other than the difference in the total number of exposed and unexposed items, 
the relationship between the number of the exposed items and that of the unexposed 
items also plays a critical role to impact the model’s sensitivity. As exhibited by Table 
8, the sensitivity of the conditions with 50 percent exposed items (which is the 
number of exposed items equal to that of unexposed items) is greater than the case 
with 30 percent exposed items where the number of exposed items is less than that of 
unexposed, and the case with 70 percent exposed items where the number of exposed 
items is greater than that of unexposed items. For example, when the cheating size is 
5percent, the sensitivity of the case with 50percent exposed items in the short test for 
effective cheaters is 74.31 percent, which is greater than the sensitivity of the 
corresponding cases with 30percent exposed items (69.53 percent) and 70 percent 
exposed items (71.25 percent). Figure 6 is plotted to demonstrate the impact of test 
length (the total number of items) and relationship between the number of exposed 




Figure 9. The Average Sensitivity by Test Length. “+”= the short test; “Δ”= the long test; 
“cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size 
with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are 
exposed. 
In Figure 9, the sensitivity in the long test cases (represented by “Δ”) is 
uniformly greater than that in the short test cases (represented by “+”). Within each 
cheating size (each group of three points linked together by lines), the middle points 
representing the cases with 50 percent exposed items are higher than the other two 
points which represents the 30 percent and 70 percent exposed items. This cheating 
model requires a decent number of both exposed and unexposed items to reliably 
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detect test cheaters. A decrease of either exposed or unexposed items could undermine 
this model’s power to detect test cheaters, even though the test has a large total 
number of items. Generally, the model seems to be more sensitive when the number 
of exposed items is less than that of unexposed items. In contrast, the model is slightly 
more conservative when the number of the exposed items is greater than that of 
unexposed items.  
As a summary, an item number increase in either exposed or unexposed items 
can improve the model’s power to detect test cheaters. Given a certain total number of 
items in tests, the model would derive a greater degree of sensitivity in tests with a 
balanced number of exposed and unexposed items (the number of exposed items 
equal to that of unexposed items) than in tests with an unbalanced number of exposed 
and unexposed items (the number of exposed items is either greater or less than that 
of unexposed items).   
43B42BImpact of Test Information, Cheating Degree and Cheating Size 
The impact of test information, cheating degree and cheating size is discussed 
only in high effective cheating cases because the impact of these three factors has the 
same pattern in the three different level of cheating effectiveness. The sensitivity 
across cheating degree, information and cheating size in high effective cheating cases 
is presented in Table 9 and also plotted in Figure 10. 
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In Table 9, the sensitivity of the informative testFF6FF (bolded rows) is uniformly 
higher than that of the normal testFF7FF (not bolded rows) in every condition. Test 
information can improve the model’s power to detect test cheaters. Similarly, the 
sensitivity of the conditions in the high cheating degree cases (exposed items being 
cheated by 80 percent-100 percent of the whole cheaters) is uniformly higher than that 
of the corresponding conditions in the low cheating degree cases (exposed items being 
cheated by 50 to 80 percent of the whole cheaters). An increasing cheating degree can 
lead to a higher degree of cheating information, and thus make the model more 
sensitive in terms of cheater detection. However, the model’s sensitivity decreases 
along with the increasing cheating size. It seems that the model is not efficient to 
identify cheaters when a large scale of cheating activities occurs in tests, such as 


































































Figure 10. The Sensitivity by Test Information and Cheating Degree. “+”= the normal test; “Δ”= 
the informative test; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; 
“cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; 
“p3”=70% items are exposed. 
As shown in Figure 10, the sensitivity of the high cheating degree cases (the two 
plots on the right hand) is greater than that of the low cheating degree cases (the two 
plots on the left hand). The decreasing line means that the sensitivity decreases along 
with the increasing cheating size. The line represented by “Δ” is always higher than 
the line represented by “+”, which implies that the sensitivity of the informative test is 
uniformly higher than that of the normal test. 
The informative test with targeted location and higher degree of information 
amount enables the model to derive a greater level of accuracy relative to cheating 
identification.  As a note, such feature is practically important, especially for the 
computer adaptive tests (CAT). In CAT context, items are purposely selected 
according to the average of examinee ability, which results in the selected set of items 
have a mean equal to examinee’s ability and small standard deviation. In other words, 

























































the model might be highly useful in monitoring test cheating relative to item exposure 
in CAT settings.  
Like the cheating effectiveness, cheating degree is also a critical factor to impact 
the DGIRTM’s cheating sensitivity. The DGIRTM’s sensitivity grows when cheating 
degree increases. In other words, the cheaters with a higher level of cheating degree 
are more likely to be identified by the DGIRTM.  
As opposed to the positive impact of test information and cheating degree on the 
model’s sensitivity, the cheating size has a negative impact on the DGIRTM’s 
sensitivity. The impact of the cheating size should be due to the scale shift of the 
exposed items. Under the DGIRTM, the scale for the estimated item difficulty and 
examinee score is expected to be determined by the unexposed items. The scale 
determined by the unexposed items is the scale of the true ability for all examinees 
taking tests and items. The score difference is obtained based on this scale, by 
comparing cheaters’ cheating ability and their true ability. However, when the 
cheating size increases, the true ability scale for all the examinees is hard to align on 
the scale determined by unexposed items, but moves forward to a mixed scale 
determined by both the exposed and unexposed items instead. The scale shift moves 
further towards to the mixed scale determined by both the exposed and unexposed 
items when the cheating size goes up. This shift apparently appears with a cheating 
size above 50 percent. As a result, the score difference between the exposed items and 
unexposed items are reduced because the true ability for all examinees moves closer 
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to cheaters the cheating ability, and thus the sensitivity of the DGIRTM model 
correspondingly decreases when the cheating size 
22B21BModel Estimation Accuracy 
The DGIRTM provides both cheaters and non-cheaters true ability estimation as 
well as cheaters’ score gain, which helps stake-holders (e.g., teachers or universities) 
to make correct inference about the students’ real knowledge level and cheating 
degree. The ability to distinguish cheaters’ true ability and cheating skill is another 
unique advantage of the DGIRTM. The average Root Mean Square Difference 
(RMSD) of item difficulty and examinees’ true ability in the high effective cases is 
presented in Table 10. The RMSD of item difficulty in all the conditions in high 
effective cheating cases is plotted in Figure 8 to demonstrate the variance of RMSD. 
As a note, the accuracy of the model estimation is only discussed within the high 
effective cheating cases, because the estimation accuracy in the high effective 
cheating is of the same degree as the other two levels of cheating effectiveness. 
Table 10. The Average RMSD of Item Difficulty by Test Length in the High Effective Cheating 
Type Test length 
5% 35% 70% 
cs1p1 cs1p2 cs1p3 cs2p1 cs2p2 cs2p3 cs3p1 cs3p2 cs3p3
Item 
Difficulty 
Short Test 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.17  0.38  0.40 0.41 
Long Test 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.14  0.29  0.31 0.36 
True 
Ability 
Short Test 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.45  0.49  0.53 0.61 
Long Test 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.27  0.28  0.30 0.36 
“cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size 





Figure 11. RMSD of Item Difficulty. “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size 
with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are exposed; “p2”=50% 
items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
In Table 10, the RMSD in the long test cases is greater than the RMSD in the 
corresponding cases in the short test. The RMSD in the 70 percent cheating size is the 
greatest (i.e., the maximum RMSD of item difficulty is 0.36) and that in the 35 
percent cheating size is the smallest (i.e., the minimum RMSD is 0.13). Figure 11 also 
shows that the variance of the RMSD in the 70 percent cheating size case is 
noticeably greater than that in the other two cheating size cases, but the variance of 
the RMSD in the 5 percent and 35 percent cheating size cases is relatively small and 
stable.  The RMSD of examinee score in all conditions is plotted in Figure 12.  





























Figure 12. RMSD of True Proficiency. “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size 
with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are exposed; “p2”=50% 
items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
Similar to the item difficulty, the RMSD of examinee score increases along with 
the increasing cheating size. It reaches its highest point when cheating size is 70 
percent. Within each cheating size, the RMSD when the proportion of the exposed 
items is 70 percent reaches its greatest point. Unlike the variance of the RMSD of 
item difficulty, the variance of the RMSD of the true proficiency in different cases is 
constantly small in different exposure conditions.  
The increasing RMSD of both item difficulty and examinee score along with the 
increasing cheating size can serve as a strong evidence of the scale shift problem, 
































which is discussed in the impact of the cheating size. The increasing RMSD partly 
explains why the sensitivity drops along with the increasing cheating size. The RMSD 
of both item difficulty and true ability in the long test (the second and fourth row in 
Table 10) is greater than that of the corresponding cases in the short test (the first and 
third rows in Table 10), which explains why the sensitivity of the cheating model in 
the long test is greater than that in the short test.  
The RMSD of true ability is greater than that of item difficulty in this simulation 
study, which is partly impacted by the simulation design. Because 60 percent of the 
2000 examinees are purposely selected with a true ability less than -0.5, 30 percent of 
them are between -0.5 and 0.5 and 10 percent of them are above 0.5, which leads to 
the examinees being distributed with a mean -0.3. However, the prior of the true 
ability is set as standardized normal distribution with a mean 0. The gap between 
examinees’ simulated distribution and the prior contributes to the greater level of 
RMSD of the true ability as well as the cheating ability.  
As a complement to describe the model’s estimation accuracy, the correlation 
between the estimated values and their true values are plotted in Figure 13 for both 
item difficulty and true ability. With respect to item difficulty, the correlation is stably 
as high as one with small variance in the cases with 5 percent and 35 percent cheating 
size, however, the correlation sharply drops and variance greatly increases in the case 
with 70 percent cheating size. With respect to the correlation of true ability, it is less 
than that of item difficulty with greater variance. In the case with 70 percent cheating 
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size, the correlation reaches its lowest among all the three cheating sizes. The lowest 
correlation between the estimated values and true values in the 70 percent cheating 
size cases is a strong evidence to indicate that the scale shift problem does exist and 
become increasingly apparent with increasing cheating size.  
 
Figure 13. The Correlation between the True and Estimated Values. “cs1”=cheating size with 5% 
cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% 
items are exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
In summary, the estimation error increases in both the item and true ability when 
the cheating size increases. When cheating size is less than 70 percent, the RMSD of 
both item difficulty and true ability is maintained at a low level, however, it sharply 
goes up when cheating size is at 70 percent level. The correlation similarly has the 
opposite directionality linked with increasing cheating size. Altogether, the DGIRTM 
































does not perform as well as expected and has low levels of power to detect cheaters 
and unacceptable model estimation error when cheating size is at 70 percent level. 
The increasing estimation error in both item difficulty and true ability confirms that 
the model’s scale drifts away from its original scale of true ability due to the selection 
of a prior distribution towards to the scale determined by the cheating ability. The 
increasing estimation error serves as one of key causes of the decreasing sensitivity 
along with the increasing cheating size. However, a greater test-length can improve 
the DGIRTM’s estimation accuracy resulting in a greater level of sensitivity which 
somewhat remedies the negative impact of the scale drift. As a note, the scale shift 
problem can be fixed by improving the DGIRTM’s estimation algorithm, which will 
be briefly discussed in the following section.  
23B22BComparison of DGIRTM with lz Index and t-test 
44B43BComparison with lz Index 
The lz index, as one of the best person-fit indices to detect unusual response 
patterns, is conducted to serve as a baseline for comparison to illustrate the model’s 
improvement in detecting test cheating. The sensitivity of the lz index and the 
DGIRTM in the set of short test conditions is plotted in Figure 14 and the set of long 
test conditions is plotted in Figure 15. In Figure 14 and Figure 15, the sensitivity of 
the cheating model is represented by “Δ” and that of the lz index is represented by 
“+”. There are totally 16 lines in these two figures, where eight lines are formed by 
the cheating model by three full crossed conditions (two levels of standard deviation 
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of item difficulty, two locations of the mean of item difficulty and two levels of 
cheating degree for exposed items).  
Like the DGIRTM, the sensitivity of the lz index is impacted by the cheating 
effectiveness and cheating size. The sensitivity of the lz index increases when the 
cheating effectiveness grows, and its sensitivity drops down when the cheating size 
increases. In Figure 14, the lz index has its greatest sensitivity in the 5 percent 
cheating size and high-effective cheating cases. Its sensitivity is almost at 0 in all the 
three levels of cheating effectiveness when the cheating size is 70 percent, and in the 
low-effective cheating cases, its sensitivity is close to 0 at all the three levels of 
cheating size.   
Compared to the DGIRTM, the lz index seems to be less sensitive than the 
DGIRTM. The DGIRTM exhibits a greater degree of robustness over the cheating size 




Figure 14. The Sensitivity of the lz and the Cheating Model in Short Test. “Δ”=the sensitivity of 
the cheating model; “+”= the sensitivity of lz index; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; 
“cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are 
exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
The lz index in the long test cases exhibits a similar pattern as it exhibits in the 
short test cases, as shown in Figure 15. Its sensitivity drops when the cheating size 
decreases or the cheating effectiveness drops. Especially, when the cheating size is 70 
percent or when the cheating activities are low effective, the lz index has no power to 
detect cheating. Although the lz index achieves a higher level of sensitivity in the long  
test than it does in the short test, the DGIRTM has a greater sensitivity level than the 
lz index in long test cases. 
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Figure 15. The Sensitivity of the lz and the Cheating Model in Long Test of Delta 1. “Δ”=the 
sensitivity of the cheating model; “+”= the sensitivity of lz index; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% 
cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% 
items are exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed 
Unlike the sensitivity, the lz index has as a high level of specificity as the 
DGIRTM. The specificity of both the lz index and the DGIRTM in the set of short test 
conditions is plotted in Figure 16 and that in the set of long test conditions is plotted  
in Figure 17, where “Δ” represents the specificity of the cheating model and “+” 
represents the specificity of the lz index.  
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Figure 16. The Specificity of the lz and the Cheating Model in Short Test of Delta 1. “Δ”=the 
sensitivity of the cheating model; “+”= the sensitivity of lz index; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% 
cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% 
items are exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
As shown in Figure 13, the lz index and the DGIRTM do not exhibit much 
difference. However, the specificity of the DGIRTM shows a higher level of stability 
than the lz index. For instance, the specificity of the lz index has some sharply drops 
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in the high effective cheating cases when the cheating size is 70 percent.  
Similarly, the lz index in Figure 17 is able to maintain its specificity at the same 
level as the DGIRTM does. However, the specificity of the lz index exhibits some 
sharp drops in both high effective and medium effective cheating cases when the 
cheating size is 70 percent. Compared to specificity in the short test cases, the 
specificity in the long tests is slightly less stable in the long test cases.  
As a summary, the sensitivity of the lz index is strongly impacted by the cheating 
effectiveness and cheating size. It seems to lose its power to detect cheating activities 
when the cheating size is around or above 35 percent and the cheating activities is at 
the medium or low level effective. However, the lz index is able to maintain a high 
level of specificity (above 95 percent) in most of the conditions, but its specificity 
exhibits unusual drops in some cases. Although the test length could increase the 
power of the lz index to detect test cheating, it also undermines the stability of the 
specificity of the lz index. Compared to the lz index, the DGIRTM is better in terms of 





Figure 17. The Specificity of the lz and the Cheating Model in Long Test of Delta 1. “Δ”=the 
sensitivity of the cheating model; “+”= the sensitivity of lz index; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% 
cheaters; “cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% 
items are exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
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45B44BComparison with a t-test for MLEs (Exposed and Non-exposed Items) 
The t-test is designed based on the two sets of items (exposed and unexposed 
items). As opposed to the cheating model, the t-test is simple and well-accepted by 
practitioners. If the t-test could derive a better sensitivity and specificity, it would be 
redundant for us to develop and conduct such a complex cheating model analysis. The 
sensitivity of the t-test and the cheating model in the set of short test conditions is 
plotted in Figure 18 and its corresponding specificity is plotted in Figure 19, where 
“Δ” still represents the specificity of the cheating model and “+” represents the 
specificity of the t-test.  
In Figure 18, the sensitivity of the t-test decreases when the cheating size 
increases, but its sensitivity does not experience a sharp drop when the cheating 
effectiveness decreases. The t-test’s sensitivity is uniformly greater than that of the 
DGIRTM in all the conditions.  However, the t-test is not as effective as the cheating 
model in terms of the specificity.  
The t-test’s specificity is not stable, as shown in Figure 19, across difference 
cheating sizes. For example, its specificity is approximately 60 percent when the 
cheating size is 5 percent and it reaches approximately 90 percent when the cheating 
size is 70 percent. In addition, the cheating effectiveness also greatly impacts its 
specificity. For example, its specificity is almost as high as that of the cheating model 
in the 70 percent cheating size cases when the cheating is high effective, but its  
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specificity is uniformly less than that of the cheating model in all the conditions when 
the cheating is at low effective level.   
 
Figure 18. The Sensitivity of the t-test and Cheating Model in Short Test. “Δ”=the sensitivity of the 
cheating model; “+”= the sensitivity of the t-test; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; 
“cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are 
exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; p3”=70% items are exposed. 










































































Figure 19. The Specificity of the t-test and Cheating Model in Short Test. “Δ”=the specificity of the 
cheating model; “+”= the specificity of the t-test; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; 
“cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are 
exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
 





















































































































































The sensitivity of the t-test and the cheating model is plotted in Figure 20 for the 
set of conditions in long test and the corresponding specificity is shown in Figure 21. 
The t-test still outperforms the cheating model in terms of the sensitivity, and the 
degree of outperformance is much less than that in the short test. Similarly, the 
cheating model is still better than the t-test in terms of the specificity, and the degree 
of difference between the cheating model’s specificity and t-test’s specificity is less 
than that in the short test cases.  
Although the t-test is a simple significance test, it is effective at detecting test 
cheaters. However, it is unable to maintain a constant high level of specificity. 
Specifically, its sensitivity is also impacted by the cheating size and cheating 
effectiveness. An increasing cheating size or a decreasing cheating effectiveness 
results in a less sensitive t-test. The t-test is able to derive a higher level of specificity 
when cheating size grows, but a lower level of specificity when cheating effectiveness 
drops.  
As compared to the DGIRTM, the t-test is better in terms of the sensitivity, but 
worse in terms of the specificity. From an ethical and practical standpoint, having a 
low rate of false positives should rank as the first priority and should be the first 
principle for all practitioners in preventing or detecting test cheating. Based on this 
principle, the cheating detection model shows extreme promise for application in real 





Figure 20. The Sensitivity of the t-test and Cheating Model in Long Test. “Δ”=the sensitivity of the 
cheating model; “+”= the sensitivity of the t-test; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; 
“cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are 
exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
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Figure 21. The Specificity of the t-test and Cheating Model in Long Test. “Δ”=the specificity of the 
cheating model; “+”= the specificity of the t-test; “cs1”=cheating size with 5% cheaters; 
“cs2”=cheating size with 35% cheaters; “cs3”=cheating size with 70% cheaters. “p1”= 30% items are 
exposed; “p2”=50% items are exposed; “p3”=70% items are exposed. 
 






































































































































As a note, the scale shift problem faced by the cheating model, to a large degree, 
can be fixed by adjusting the estimation algorithm, and the model’s sensitivity level 
could also be increased using this new estimation algorithm (which will be discussed 
in the final chapter).  The cheating model is a promising and attractive tool that 
practitioners could use to respond proactively to individual and organized test 
cheating.  
24B23BConclusion 
In the simulated settings, the Deterministic, Gated IRT model seems to be a 
promising tool for detecting test cheating with a small degree of mistakes. One of the 
valuable characteristics of the model is that its specificity is maintained at a high level 
in every joint condition considered. The practical implication is that the model 
generally makes a small degree of mistakes in different applied settings. Such 
characteristics ensure that innocent test takers are treated with fairness in the cheating 
analysis.  
As compared to the model’s specificity, the model’s sensitivity is greatly 
impacted by test cheating effectiveness. Generally speaking, cheating effectiveness 
and cheating degree are two aspects measuring cheating severity that determine the 
model’s sensitivity. As shown in the study, the sensitivity in the high-effective 
cheating cases is the highest, the sensitivity of the low-effective cases is the lowest, 
and the sensitivity of the medium-effective cases is between that of the high-effective 
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and medium-effective cases. Given a certain cheater’s increasing cheating 
effectiveness, his/her probability of being detected grows. Other than cheating 
effectiveness, an increasing cheating degree (the degree of each exposed items have 
been cheated by cheaters) can increase the probability of cheaters being detected. In 
other words, the probability of cheaters being detected grows when he/she cheats on a 
greater number of items.  
Test length, as a critical factor determining test information, exhibits its power to 
impact model’s sensitivity and estimation accuracy. An increasing test length results 
in an increasing model sensitivity and a greater level of accuracy to characterize 
cheaters’ real knowledge level and cheating severity. More specifically, the sensitivity 
is impacted by the number of exposed items and unexposed items. Given a certain 
total number of items, if the item number of exposed items is less than that of 
unexposed items, the model tends to be conservative and makes less degree of 
mistakes (which means a higher degree of specificity and a lower degree of 
sensitivity). However, if the number of exposed items is greater than that of 
unexposed items, the model tends to be more literal and makes a slightly higher 
degree of mistakes (which means a higher degree of sensitivity and a lower degree of 
sensitivity). When the number of exposed items is equal to that of unexposed items, 
the model derives the highest level of sensitivity and specificity. In other words, the 
model requires a decent number of exposed items and unexposed items to derive a 
high level of sensitivity and specificity.  
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In the two comparisons, the DG-IRT model greatly outperforms the lz index in 
terms of sensitivity and performs as well as the lz index in terms of specificity. The lz 
index seems to lose its power when the cheating size is large or cheating effectiveness 
is low. The t-test seems to be more powerful to detect test cheating due to its higher 
level of sensitivity. As study shows that it could almost identify every cheater, but the 
lz is too liberal. A lot of non-cheaters are identified as cheaters, especially in the cases 
where cheating size is low (e.g., 5% and 35% cheating size cases). Although the 
model is not as sensitive as the t-test, it maintains a high degree of specificity in every 
case.  
As a special note, the DG-IRT model becomes less and less sensitive when the 
cheating size becomes greater and greater. In practice, it means that the model might 
not be an efficient tool to detect and respond to concert or organized test cheating. 
This limitation is referred to as a scale shift problem of the model in the previous 
section. Apparently, the scale of the estimated item difficulty and examinee score 
drifts away from its true ability scale to a scale of the combination of true ability scale 
and cheating ability scale. Essentially, the model’s basic assumption that the item does 
not change whether the examinee cheats or not is violated. However, it could be fixed 
by changing the prior of cheating ability, by allowing a free estimation of the mean 
and standard deviation of the normal distribution of the cheating ability. Such new 
estimation algorithm in R, which fixes the scale shift problem, is provided in the 
index at the end of this dissertation.  
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The DGIRTM is a promising tool to detect test cheating due to item preview, 
item memorization or internet collaboration on the basis of its performance in the 




26B25BSIGNIFICANCE, LIMITATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
27B26BSignificance 
Test cheating, as a negative factor invalidating the inference made based on tests, 
is commonly recognized by stake-holders of various tests. Testing agencies or other 
stakeholders have suffered great pain from diffusedly existing test cheating, especially 
in high-stake tests. Statistical cheating detection methods, as one of important 
methodologies to detect test cheating, have been proposed and researched by 
intelligent precedents, however, they re frail in terms of their methodology design, 
sensitivity, specificity and information they provide. Unlike traditional approaches 
(e.g., copying indices, person fit indices) which rely on aggregation of individual 
statistics (Segall, 2002), the Deterministic, Gated IRT model derives test cheating or 
test compromise summaries by response matrix. This cheating model seems to be an 
attractive and promising tool for practitioners to respond to test cheating by both 
individual and organized cheating, given its modeling design, the provided 
information, sensitivity and specificity level
This cheating model is designed to detect the score gain (the score gain from the 
cheating activities). In real testing settings, the effective cheaters (e.g., those who 
cheat make significant score gains) jeopardize the validity of tests. The more effective 
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cheaters are, the greater the impact on the validity of tests grows. From a practical 
standpoint, “effective cheaters” must be identified, so that the impact on test validity 
can be examined and appropriate actions can be taken to reduce the impact of 
cheating (when deemed necessary). As shown by the study, under this cheating model, 
high effective cheaters are most likely to be detected, medium effective cheaters are 
less likely to be detected and low effective cheaters are least likely to be identified. 
Although this cheating model is not effective to identify low-effective cheating, it is 
the low-effective cheaters who have no or little impact on the validity of tests. What 
makes this cheating model even more attractive is that it is able to maintain a high 
level of specificity in every joint condition considered in this dissertation. This 
cheating detection model is able to detect effective cheaters with a small degree of 
error.  
The other nice feature of this cheating model is the information it provides. One 
of the key information provided by the cheating model is the cheating probability for 
each single examinee ( ). Given higher value of  for a certain test taker, the 
probability of being a cheater for that test taker grows. Such probability represents the 
degree of severity of cheating tendency. Not only providing a single cheating 
probability, this model also characterizes cheaters’ real knowledge level by (θt) and 
the severity of their cheating activities (θc), which enable practitioners to have deeper 




Based on the current study, we believe that the Deterministic, Gated IRT model 
is an effective model that can be used to detect test cheaters. The stability and high 
accuracy in specificity, capability to characterize cheaters’ real knowledge level and 
cheating degree, and its sensitiveness in detecting effective cheaters, make it a 
promising tool to proactively respond to the individual or organized test cheating. 
28B27BLimitation and Future Study 
This model is designed to mainly detect test cheating by item-preview, item 
memorization or internet-collaboration. Its application in other cheating settings might 
be limited and demand further research and investigation. Based on current study, this 
model proves to be useful in large-scale tests where a large number of examinees and 
items are available, but its application feasibility in tests with small sample sizes (e.g., 
classroom level formative assessment) might be limited. The reason for this is that 
MCMC is used as the model’s estimation algorithm. MCMC estimation requires a 
large sample size to obtain reliable and accurate estimation. The model is Rash-Model 
based which does not take guessing and item discrimination into account. However, 
guessing does exist when examinees answer the questions, and a lot of practitioners 
believe that items’ different levels of discrimination should be estimated. Therefore, 
the impact of guessing on the model’s sensitivity and specificity should be further 
researched. As a further research direction, this model may be extended by 
incorporating both pseudo-guessing and item discrimination parameters.  
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Generally speaking, the Deterministic, Gated IRT model is not only a cheating 
model which can only be applied in detecting test cheating. It can be seen as a general 
model to distinguish two groups of examinees and be able to characterize the two 
groups of examinees with two latent traits. For instance, if the model input is defined 
as item status relative exposure status, it is the model that is used to detect test 
cheating caused by item exposure (the case discussed in this dissertation). The group 
of cheaters who have significant score gain is distinguished from the group of 
non-cheaters who have no significant cheaters. The cheating ability (a combination of 
true ability and score gain) is the latent trait to characterize the group of cheaters and 
the true ability is the latent trait to characterize the group of non-cheaters. If the model 
input is used to group items by two different administration time, it becomes a model 
that can be used to monitor the examinee growth made between the two testing time. 
Specifically, it could distinguish a group of students who have significant growth 
from a group of students who have not significant growth. Therefore, the model’s 
appropriate application in other areas, such as Differential Item Functioning, Student 
Growth, Scaling Shift, is another research direction which deserves attention.  
Although the DGIRTM successfully overcomes some limitations of the previous 
cheating detection techniques, this new model is certainly not immune to abuse or 
probative misuse. “There remains an enormous amount of empirical research left to 




application in different real settings is the ultimate purpose for us to develop, and the 
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11B11BAPPENDIX A: THE CODE OF THE DETERMINISTIC, GATED IRT 
MODEL  
The Deterministic, Gated IRT model estimation is provided in this appendix. 
This code is built within R static language by following the specification of the prior 
distributions listed in the model estimation section.  
 
# Rash Model 
Rash<-function(thetas,betas,alphas){ 
p<-matrix(NA,length(thetas),length(betas)) 


























































































































In this set of code, N is the number of examinees, J is the number of items. X is the response 
pattern, Expose is the model input to label the item exposure status. Iter is the number of iterations 
for MCMC. 
 
